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The need  for  justifying  public  training  programs  is often  under-
appreciated.  International  experience  strongly  indicates  that  the
cost-effectiveness  of alternative  options should be taken into
account  in the design  of such programs.
The Policy, Research, and Extemal Affairs Complex distuibute  PRE Working Papers todisseminate the findings of work in progress and
to enoourage the exchange of ideas among Bank staff and all others interested in development issues. These papers carry the names of
the authors, reflect only their views, and should be used and cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the
















































































































dPolicy,  Research,  and External  Affairs I
Education  and Employment
WPS 716
This paper-a  product of thl Education and Employment Division,  Population and Human Resources
Department - is part of a larger effort in PRE to examine goverunents'  role in the financing of training
programs.  Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.
Please contact Cynthia Cristobal, room S6-035, extension 33640 (68 pages).
Many policymakers have assumed that the state  Examples of nonfinancial interventions
should play a dominant role in providing train-  include the exemption of apprentices from
ing.  Dougherty and Tan set out to appraise the  minimum wage legislation, campaigns to in-
rationale and scopc for cost-effective govern-  crease the commitment of firms to training; and
ment intervention to mobilize resources for  pump-priming operations such as providing
training.  They also document international  technical help to establish enterprise-based
experience with alternative arrangements.  training programs.
Their review indicates that the case for  Equity and social concems provide perhaps
financial interventions and the analysis of the  the clearest argument for subsidizing training
incidence of interventions are complex  Several  through general public revenue, focusing on
factors demcnstratc a need to make the analytical  training activities with benefits for society
input into evaluations of these interventions  beyond those accruing to individual trainees.
more rigorous.  Institutions where apprenticeship and other
initial training are an alternative to continued
First, this analysis can reduce the risk of a  education, and a strong case exisLs  for subsidiz-
misallocation of resources - a particular hazard  ing those in the training stream to the sante
when interventions involve subsidies that alter  extent as their peers in general education.
the effective price of training services that
employers or trainees must pay.  In concluding, the authors note that policy-
makers often overlook the complementarity
Second, such analysis can reduce the risk of  between basic education and later skill develop-
unnecessarily increasing the burden on the public  ment.  The consequence is that resources may be
purse.  Rigorous inquiry about the need for an  spent on expensive, low volume training pro-
intervention, and its likely impact, may disclose  grams when they might be used more cost-
that the intervention is not justified or is justified  effectively and more equitably to upgrade the
only on a smaller scale.  Another outcome might  quality of basic education.
be to demonstrate that intervention is justifled
but that it could take a nonfinancial form.
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iiExecutive  Summary
wprivate  fianin  e8 &&l
Until  comparatily reently, most  training  in maost  counies has  been  enterprise-basd  and  has boee
financed by the employer, by the trainee, or by both jointly, normaly without money chanoging  hands.  In
most  countries,  tis  remains  the case. As a first  approximation,  the  cost of  firm-specific  training  is absobed
by the employer,  and the cost of tranferable triing  is shifed to the tainee by menm  of a reduction  in his
wages,  often within  the  fiamewok  of an apprenticeship  agreement.  The first chapter  e  s  the rtaionale
for this dvision of the burden and the way  that it may  be modified  in certain  ircw  ae  The mnost
impotant modification  to the analysis  is the finding  that fims may  be prepare to absorb  part or all of the
cost of bransferable  training  when  ere are constraints  on labour mobility  or when  there is asymmetric
information  among  firma  concernng  the value  of the trainig.  The chapter  also notes  the role played  by
proprietary  institute financed  by the fees paid  by the trainees.
Te  case for goveument Interventn
Chapter  2 enfines  the arguments  for the subsidization  of twaing fiom publc funds. The case
can be  made  under  four  headins  market  failure, exernalities,  equity consideratons,  and  soca
considerations.
Ma*tfal  uwe: Te  mI  types  of market  failur relevt  to trin  provision  are the faue  of employers
to respond to training  icenies  through  inertia  or other reasons;  faiure  of ididuals  to respond to
training oppotunies;  minum  wage legislation  and other wage rigidities; capianmarket imperfections
and risk averseness;  and rWdities  in the provision  of in-service  training
All of these argments are peruasve, and possbly  the most important  in terms of its negatie
impact  is the first,  the faile  of some employers  to respond  to incentivs to provide  training. Tis  ing
is of cowse  just one aspect  of a wider probem of pow managemeat,  and the approprate respone would
be a packe  which  took a balanced  approach  to re  ig  an  ial shortooming  In Praice  it is
difficult to evalua  the extent to which any gm  enterprs  is fing  to respond to incenes.  Small
enterprises,  in paular,  often  provide  relatiely little  training.  but it is difficult  to tell whether  this should
be attributed  to manrial  deficiencies  or whether  it is in fact  a rational  consequence  of their  use of simple
technology  with limted skill  requirement.  This cals for cautin  in dte design  of inc  ve schemes,
especially  those targeted  at small  enterprises
Individuals  may  fail to take up traing  op  es  at the wages  offered  because  they  underrate
the value of the training  or because they are unduly pessimistic bout the future employment prospectL
in either case subsidization  may be justified,  but an altenave  measues  would  be improved  vocatonal
couseffing
Minimum  wage  legislation  or wage  fidities  attrable  to union  or social  influence  undoubtedly
prevent  employers  from shifting  the cost  of transferble traing  to the trainee  in some  countriea  and hence
inhibi the provison of sc  training.  The subsidization  of initia  may then be jus  if direc
moamm aimed  at e  X  imi  d  the riidity are impracticable  or undesirable  beaus  they  conflict  wth ote
oeil  objetives.Subsidization  may  be justified  if shiftg  the oot of tranderable  training  to trainees  woud requr
the latter to accept  wages  below  subsisteonce  lvel, and capital  market  imperfections  make  it impossible  for
them te borrow.  Similarly  it may  be justified  if risk-averseness  deter  idviduals from makd  uingW
invsents  which  in ot  respects  are rationaL Hower,  in beth of these  cases,  direc meaures should
also be considered,  for example  sudent loam with  incom f  repayment  conditions.
Subsidization  may  also  be justified  for  the promotion  of in-service  training  of a tranferable natue.
Frms providing  it usually  have limited  scope  for recven  its cos from the trainees  dung  the training
period.  Hence in the absence of suidies  ceing  pant of its cost such training may be underprovided.
&temaia:  The chief  externales cited  as grounds  for subsidizing  training  are:  the improved  utilization
of underutiized  manpower  by  alleviating  structural  unemployment;  the rain  of skill  standards  through  the
benign  effect  of well-trained  workers  on the skill  development  of those  working  with them;  the breaking
of bottlenecks  resticting economic  growth  caused  by shortages  of citical skills;  the ability  of a pool of
wained  labour  to attract  imvestment;  and reduction  i  inflation. Of these  arguments,  the first is perhaps
the most  compelling,  and there  may  be some  substance  in the second. However  there is litt  evidence  that
the other three are of practical  importance.
Equity  cocems:  Wher  apprenticeship  and other initial  trining is an alternat  to continued  general
education,  there is a strong  case  for subsidizing  those in the raining  steam to the same  extent  at their  peers
in the education  stream.  In addition,  it may  also be argued  that the taining of the disadvantaged  should
be subidized
Soial coaws:  There may  be a case  for subsidizing  taining pro8rammes  that have  social  externalities  -
social  benfits which  are not captured  by individuals  or their employer
Chapter  3 revies exerienc  with  the various  tps  of subsidy  scheme  that have  been  implemented
in differet parts of the world. Although  formaly  such  schemes  have  been  implemented  in many  different
guisesn,  i  economic  terms  they  are essentially  equvalent  they  reduce  the net cost of traing  which  is the
cs  of traiing induding  the wage  cost of trainees,  less the value  of trainee  output  and subsidies.  Where
schemes  do differ  is in the criteria  for elility  for grants and the scale  of the grants.
Although  trainng gn  progammes have  been established  by governments  in many  developing
countrie, there have  been relativly few  citical evaluations  of their impact. This is in itself  a significant
finding,  su  g  as it does  that the support  for them  is intuitive  rather than objective. In those  countries
where  ev  _ali  have  been  made  (notably  Brazi, Chile,  South  Korea,  Singapore  and Taiwan),  the genral
condusion  is that the impact  of the programmes,  in terms of average  duration  of trainiug  received  per
worker  in scope  per year,  has been instantiaL  Further,  even  the low  figures  recorded  may  overestimate
the true impac of the progmmes, since  it is reasnable to suppose  that much  of the traiing qualifying  for
graSs would  have  been undertakn anyway. Typically  the main  beneficiaries  of the programmes  have  been
larger firms;  sma  firms tend to be detered  from paricipation by the overhead  costs of organizing
suctuoed ltraining  and the administrative  costs of partcipation.  Their employees  may  also tend to have
low  traiing  nes.
2Not only  may  taining grnt  schemes  have  less  impact  ta  is ofte claimed  for them,  but they  may
also  have  adve  side-effects. lbitiy  criteria  may  lead  to a bias towards  overly-stutured and inflexible
bsang  arrangements, and  to  unecessarly  high u  oit  Prcrammes  also  impose  ignificant
costs on both the public authority  f  le  for them and on th  firms partdpating  in them.
As an altematvB  to subsidizing  eterprise-based raini  in mny  countries  public  resources  are
used to fund or subidize  the institutional provision of off-the-job training  oures.  Such courses are
typicaUy  for  initial  training  and  full-time,  though  eeptions  in both respects  are common. Suc programmes
bave  had a major  impact  on ski  development  in many  coumtries Howev, their  cost-effectiwness  depends
criticaly  on their management  and other  factors  and can  vaIy  enormously.  For a review  of the issues,  and
a comprison with enterprise-based  tining,  see Dougherty  (1989).
Souree of finance
hmate,finacb.  The bulk of training  in most counties is financed  privately  (Chapter  1).  Nevettheless
there may  be considerable  scope  for icreasig  the scale  of pnvately-financed  training.  In particular,  the
government  may be able to promote  apprenticeship  raining  to the advantage  of both trainees and their
employers,  by assigning  it a legal status which separates it from regular employment.
Furher,  there  may be significant scope for enbanced  cot-recovery  in public training isites
through  the charging  of fees.  Often,  the absence  of cost-recovery  is backed  by little more than tradition.
The introduction  of substantdve  fees might  call for the establishment  of a trainee  loan programme  on the
lieis of those established  for  iger education  in a number  of countries.  However,  this remains  largely
unexlored teritory.
Pub&c  rvew:  There is a prima facie case for using  general public revenue  to finace  interventins
motivated  by equity  or other social  considerations,  the equity  argument  having  particular  force  in the case
of pre-employment  traiing.  Where  young  people  of lower  academic  ability  are channelled  into traing
programmes,  while  those of higher  abiity remain  subidized  education,  it would  be discriminatory  not to
give  equal  financial  assistane to those  who  are in any cae less privileged.  The use of general  revenue  has
the practical  advantage  that it does not require  additional  revenue-collectg  machinery,  but it also has the
disadvantage  that it may  be a vulnerable  source  of fumding  in times  of recsion.
Payrl  taxw:  Payroll  taxes  have  been used very  wndely  to fund trainng progmmes, especaly in Latn
America,  the schemes  varying  i  coverage  from all employers  to individual  industries.  The rationale  for a
scheme  is typically  that the provision  of training  is inadequate  and that the scheme  will  lead to an increase
financed  by its beneficiaries.  It would  seem  that practical  considerations  also contribute  to the popuiari
of the payrol tax: it may  provide  a source  of shelered resources  in times  of recesion and it may  constitute
a means  of mobilizing  financial  resources  otherwise  inaccessible  to the public  sector.
Whetr  it is used to provide  the resources  required by a central training  agency,  or to fund
incen  for firms to increase  their training provision,  the payroll  tax ia at first sight an attractive
iument.  How  r when  a closer  analysis  is underaken its attractions  are somewhat  diminished.  There
is the problem of determining the justifiable scale of such an intervention and there is the tricky problem
of identifying  the icidence of such a tax. Inevitably  there will  be employers  and individuals  who make
widll  ains and others who  make correspondig  losses.  Even  the practical  virtues  are open to doubt,
3dsdoe  the  mayealoa  to ove  rlnah  and thee  inh  ei  tan bas  may  not  be  as geat  as
apsom at firs dst.  A reviw of th  UJ.  e  with  levy/grant  shemes IB  provided  in  the App
n  r8aa  that policymakig g  dwith  to brainig finance  ha a tendency  to be impulsive,  with
adves  eq  fo the desg of ithe  btand  Indeed,  t  thinsing  behind  sme  mes  seem
to bahve  nmuted  to littl  moe than an  on  dud, since  the economy  could  benefit  from th  btg
of  more  died  werke  the govemen  or iusty  shold hiter  to pomot  ea  training
prisin  However,  th  same  argment could  be appled to most productive  goods  and seivos, and  oe
some  final  goods  and  services.  As wI  them  ae  uses  of public  funds,  if there is a case  for subsidy,
it must be made  more  rgorousy.
Seond, there appoas to be  a systemadc  tendency  for  policymakers  to overlook  the  cplementa
between  bade education  and late  skill  development The consequenc  is that  resources  may  be spent on
epensive lowvolume  Waning  pr  es when  they  might  more cost-ffectively  and more  equiably be
used  to upgrade  th  qlty  of basic  education. The  fact that  spehd  aining  programmes  tend  to have
agt we  pret  and more i  _uendal  labby  d  than  basie  education  reiforces the bias in their favour.
4In most countries  the cost of training  is  rd  by individuals  eateps  and government  The
pwpose  of this  paper  is  to appris  the scop for  cost-effective  government  intervention  into  the mobilization
of gesoures  for trainiug,  ex  ngmeasures  catalytic  in nature  as well  as direct  interventions.  There used
to be a  tendncy,  especially  developng  countries,  for it to be assumed  that  the state  should  play a
dominant  role  in training  provision.  In recent  years  economic  recession  and shrinking  govenmnent  revenues
have  forced  a recunsideration  of this view  which  has led to a growing  acknmowedgment  and appreciation  of
the role of the pfivate  sector.  Although  the documentation  is incomplete,  it is now evident  that th
ment  is, and always  has been, the  junior parter  nerly evrywhere.
In recognition  of tis  fact,  the first tasks  of this paper  are to dicu  the contrbution  of the private
sedor  and to analyze the radonale  for government interenton.  Next, in those cass  where interentison
is thought  to be desirable,  is the issue of how best to provide  financial  incentives. What has been the
experie  with  different  instruments? Finally,  there is the issue  of how  to mobflize  the resources  required
for financial  interveion.
As far as possible  it bas been attempted to miimize the overlap  between this survey  and a
compano study  of traing  cost-effectieness  (Dougherty,  £989). In particular,  i  evaluatng  a government
fiaingn  intervention,  the main  concern  has been  whether  the intervention  achieved  ts intended  impact  on
the provsion  of training,  and not whether  the objectie was  well-oonceived  in the first  place.  However,  it
has not been possible  to maintain  an orderly  division  of labour. Financial  interventions  are heavily  biased
towards  th  promotin of formal  trang  methods,  for the smple reaon that eligibility  for  benefits  is usualy
resbited to structured  schemes,  and it is desirable  to consider  the implications
The term tiraiing is used her  to coewr  all forms  of insrction  with some  occupational  televanea
and it therefore  covers  a spe  ranging  from  task-specific  insu  o  to intuction in general  PrinciPles
The use of a singe term is not meant  to imply  that the heterogeneity  of traiing  is irrelevant  for financing
isues.  On  the  conrry,  it will be  seen  that  the  postion  of  any  given  form  of  istruction  in the  spectrum
is of  ritica impotance for determining  who pays for it.  The term is used to avoid  the unsound
claficatimo  that have  given rs  to so much  conflit  in the literatue on trainig  There used
to be a  tende  to refer to  instruion  towards  t  oneral  end of the specun  as vocational  or technical
education  and to that at the more  spedfic  end as vocational,  technical  or occupational  training,  but attempts
to make uoh  a distincdon,  like  the parallel  distnction  between  vocational  and technical  instruction,  are  futile:
th  are no well-defined  boundaries  betwe  the putaive categones  In recogition of this, many  recent
studies  edep  the  problem  by  referring  to VET (vocadonal  education  and taining) or VWET  (wvcadal
and technical  educfio  and training).
Th  analsis is primarily  addressed  to the eonmomic  issues  suruding  the financing  of trainig  but
it  s  owedd  that soial and polidcal  factors  are often  also of grt  imponco.  The focus  of the
pap  is on financing  trWaining  in developing  cuties  However  it has been thought  desirable  to draw  on
the eqpec  of th  industrialized  countries  as wll, partly  becaus the issues  are often  simila in theso
cOuntrIe%  but mainly becau  the literature, especially the analytbie  literature,  is dominated by stdies
to them.
SThe Private Financing of Training
The two mai  prvte  fonrs of privately-financd  training are enterpisew-based  ning and
proprietary  school  training.  Data on the volume  and the cost of the former are notosiously  scarce and
uweliable,  even  in those countries  with  the most sophisicated  statiscal services. The cost of trainee  and
tiner  time, the cost of disrupto  to production  and the cost of eqipment and facilities  are all hard to
measure  in a contest  where training  is merged  with prouctive acity,  and the task is magnified  by the
dispersion and heterogeneity  of such trainig.  But if the condusions of revfse  tracer studies (for example,
US. Department  of Labor,  1964)  provide  any guide,  enterprise-based  training  is a more importan source
of skill  development  than institutional  training  for most non-professional  occupations  and it is probably  fai
to say that it consumes more resources.  Proprietary  school  trining  is  kewise  poorly documented in most
countries  but it can also represeont  a significant  share of training  provision.
1.1  The Finneing  of Enterprise-Based Training
he trditional apprenticeship ba
Until  the preseat  century,  apprenticeship  in one form  or another  was  the usual means  of entering
those  occupations  which  demanded  extended  i  training. In many  countries  it still  is, either because  it
has  retained  popular  support  as a social  institution  or because  alternative  forms  of training  provision  remi
small  in scale.  It is not ahvays  caDled  apprenticeship. Indeed,  that term is typically  reserved  for train
for the craft occupations. In non-manual  occupations,  no doubt reflecting  status differentiation,  other terms
are used instead. For example,  accountants  and lawyers  may  serve  artides,  and doctors  do internships  or
housemansps.  In some occupations,  there may  be no specal term at all, but nevertheless  the trainee  is
effectively  an apprentice  during  the training  period.
Regardless  of the terminology,  pay determination  has rested  on a simple  principle  which  has long
been  well  understood  by  both practitioners  and theorists  (it is explained,  for example,  by  Adam  Smith  in the
Weath of Natons).  It can be stated  very  briefly. An apprentice  or any other individual  receiving  inita
traing,  is in a position  to appropriate  all the benefits  of the trainig if the skills  are transferable.  If the
employer  that has trained  him (or her) does  not offer  the market  wage  once  he has qualified,  he can move
elsewhere. It follows  that, since  the tran  film cannot  reap any part of the benefits  of the training,  it
cannot  be expected  to bear any part of the costs  either, and will  shift  them  to the apprentice  by offering  a
wage lower than that paid to an unskilled  worker  who is not being trained.  This is acceptable  to the
wainees  because  on completion  of their apprenticeships  they can expect  to earn more than unqualified
worker the difference  being  "sufficient  to compensate  the superior  expence  of their  education"  (Smith,  1776,
Volume  I, p. 125).
As Becker  (1964)  has shown,  in a dassdc  work  whih formlized and greatly  developed  the theory,
the amount  that an apprentice  might  expect  to be paid  depends  on his productivity  and the cost of training.
Tie relatioship is illustrated  in styized form in Figure 1..  The individual  has the choice  of entering  an
apprentehip  at time zero  or entering  the labour  force  direcly as an unskilled  worker. If he chooses  the
6later, his  anual wage  is constant  at w 0 (the assumption  of consacy is made  for convenience).  If he enters
an apprenticesip,  his output  is given  by the cue  ABC. This is his net output  after taking  account  of the
loss of output of other workers attributable to his training (caused, for example, by slowing down  the
prduction line). The net contribution  of the apprentice  to the fr's  revenues  is his output  less  the direct
cos of taining (instructor  salaries,  cost  of trainig facilities,  training  materials,  etc). It is represented  by  the
curve  DEF and may  initially  be negative.
In the simplest  version  of the theory,  the firm  pays  a wage  exactly  equal  to the net contnbution,  so
that at no stage does it incur a net cost.  With the growing  productivity  of the apprentice, output and aet
cotntbution  tend to rise over  time. At the end of the apprnticeship  the anual output  of the trainee  is w,.
Since  traiing cos  cease  at this point,  this  will  henceforward  be his wage,  assuming  that the labour  market
is ompetitive. The total cost of training  during  the apprenticeship  is equal  to the direct  training  costs  and
the output  the apprentice  would  have  contnrbuted  if he had not been  trained,  less his actual  output. Since
the difference  between  his output  and direct  training  cost is his aet contnbution,  and hence  the apprentice
wage,  the total training  cost is equal to w. minus  the apprentice  wage,  in other words  the income  forgone
by  the apprentice.  In Figure  1.1,  the cost is given  by  the area DEP less  the area FEQ,  it being  assumed  that
the apprentice  wage  actually  exceeds  w. towards  the end of the apprenticeship.  (Of course  it may  happen
that the net contrbution never  reaches  w4  during  the apprenticeship,  and hence the apprentice  forgoes
income  throughout  his training.)
output,
net  contribution






end  of  . time
apprenticeship
Figure  1.1
7The benefit  of the training  is the increae in eaming  power  attributable  to it, (w, -w 0), and this is
the annual  return that the apprentice receives  on his  inwVStment.
It can  well  happen  that the net contribution  of the apprentice  to the frm's revenues  is initialy  not
high enough  to justify  a subsistence  wage. Indeed  it may  well  be negative.  Under these  conditions  rigid
adherfnce  to the principle  of equating  the wage  to the net contnbution  would  deter potential  trainces  from
taking  up training  places,  or prevent  them altogether  if their families  are unable  to support  them or forgo
their earning  power.  This problem  has been overcome  in several  ways:
aining  contracts: One solution  is to make apprentieship  a contractual  arrangement  with the trainee
required to stay with the employer  for a fied number  of yes.  This allows  the employer  to redistrbute
the income  of the apprentice,  overpaying  him in the fis  part of the training  and underpaying  him In the
latter part.  The wage line during training wotd  .uierefore  start  oier tha  D and  end lower  tha  F.
Slow taining:  A second  and related solution  to the  problem  is to extend the term of appreniaeshp
artificially,  reducing  the rate of training  input  made  by the  employer  and giving  him  more time  to reaosr
his  costs.
Bonding:  A third  solution  is to bond the  apprentice  to continue  to work  for the employer  for a number  of
years  after  qualification,  at presumably  a below-market  wage,  allowing  the  employer  to incur  net  costs  during
training  and recoup  them later. Bonding  is very  widespread  ih the  ce  of public  setor employment,  but
it is not hard to find instances  of its use in the private  secor.  Korean  tainees, for example,  must  remain
with  their employers  for twice  the length  of tining  although  the bond  may  be reduced  if trainees  share in
the cost of their training  (ILO, 1985). A similar  arrangement  exists  in Czechoslovakia enterprises  that
finance  a worker's  university  education  have  the right to five  yeas' servce from that wwoker  after he
graduates  (Tesar,  1981). In some countries,  the bonding  arragement is  quite  flexile in that  trainees  have
the  option  to repay  their employers  a lump  sum in return  for early  release  from the niialy agreed  length
of service.
Where  bonding  is discouraged  or prevented  by legislation  or soial norms,  it may  nevertheless  be
implemented  de facto,  the enterprise  lending  the trainee  the cost of his traiing and canceling  the  loan if
he remains  in senice for an ageed number  of yas.  British  Airways,  which  has recently  re-established  a
training  programme  for pilots  after  a lapse  of ten years,  has  adopted  the latter  varant. The  taing  takes
a year and a half and costs £100,000. Graduates  are loaned  the cost and the loan  is cancelled  after five
years  of employment  with  the airline.
Fees: A fourth solution  is to charge  fees, typically  paid  as an initial  lump  sum  by the apprentice's  family.
Although  this recourse  is no longer  found in the industriaized  counries,  its demise  is quite recent:  the
charging  of fees  was  standard  practice  in accountancy  practice  in the  U.K until  the  early  fifties  and  was  still
extant  in Ireland  in the sixties  (Robinson,  1964). It is still common  in small  enterprises  in West  Africa
(Dougherty,  1989).
8Gmene  trainng  and specific
A key contnbuion by  Becker (1964)  to tetheory  of traingfane  is he diion  bt
general  training  for  transferable  skills  and  specific  traini  for  non-transferable  ones. With egad to  8
training, the analysis follows  the traditonal theory outlined above.  In the case of specfic traing  which
raises  productivity  only  in the firm  that provde  itd  Becker's  analysis  shows  that  the costs  and benefits  of  such
invsment  wold  be shared betweea th  worker and his employer.  Beuse  the.  worker reive  par  of th
benefits,  the risk to the employer  that he or she will  quit afte  training  is reduced;  by the sme  token,
because  the employer  receives  part of the benefit the ris  of layoff  ia  also reded  Since  the benefit are
shared it follows  that the costs of training  would  also be shared to achieve  balance  in the demand  for
training  and its supply.
The share of each paty in the costs and benefits  of the i  ent depends  on various  market
conditions, induding  "the relations between quit rates and wages,  layoff rates and profits,  and on ...  [such
factors as the cost of funds,  attitudes toward risk, and desires for liquidit  (Becker, 1964,  p. 22).
Hashimoto's  (1981) formal model of the sharing arrangement  indicates  that long-mn conditions  of
competitive  equilibrium  require  that costs  be shared  in the sme  ratio as benefits.
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9In reality, most training inestments ae  neither completely  gneral  nor completely  speific.
Productivity  would  rise in other  firms  as wel, 9lthough  not by as much  as in the firm  providing  the tra9iing.
As a result, the wag  that could  be received  elwhere  would  also incase.  Becker  notes that such
investments  could  be thought  of as having  two compoents, one completely  general,  the other completely
firm-specific. k9or  such  training,  the fraction  of costg  paid by dte  firm  woud be 'inverely reled  to the
importance  of the general  component,  or postively  related  to the speific component  (Beker, 1%4,  p. 23),
the reason being  that firms  do not pay any  of the completely  genrl  eosts,  and only  par  of the completely
specific  Cost
The shaing of training  costs  between  a worker  and his employer  can be expressed  graphicaly,  as
in Fgure  12.  The growth  of a trainee's  net  contrbution  training  is again  depicted  by the cuw DEF.
If training  is completely  generai,  the trainee's  wage  profge  will  follow  this cure exacty, as in Figure 1.1
For other traiing  investments  where costs  and benefits  are shared,  the traine's  wage  profile  is
indicated  by w(t).  The firm invests  by paying  the trainee a wage higher than the value of his net
contribution  during  training,  and receives  a rtu  in post-invetment  periods  by  paying  the trainee  a wag
wa  which  is smaller  than  the value  of his marginal  product,  w,.  The firm's  costs  are indicated  by the area
DXG, minus  the area FXI (during  the first part of the apprceship  the firm  is paying  the trainee more
than  his net contribution;  for the latter part it is already  recouping  some of ks investment  bying  lessk
Of course  in practice  there  may  be no cross-or  point  during  the apprenticeship).  The  annual  return  to the
firm's  investment  is given  by (w,  1 wa)  for the time that the qualified  trainee remains  in its employmenL
As in the case  of transferable  traig  the apprnice  for his  part invests  by acepting a wage  lower
than  his alternative  wage  during  training,  in return  for benefits  later on in the form  of wages  dhat  are hgr
than his alternative  wage,  but both of these are lower than in the case of general  trag  the income
forgone  is represented  by the area PHG less the area 110O,  and the amual retur  on his investen  is
reduced  to (w - wj).
Hashimoto  (1979)  has  applied  this analys to explain  the lifetme  employment  arragement in large
Japanese  firms  that make  substantia  investents in training  His empira  analys shows  that a sizeable
component  of workers'  wages  in such  firms  consists  of  bonus  payments  (whi  fluctuate  as market  conditions
chanp), and that the  ratio  of bonus  to  eaninpincreases  as more  is  invested  in a workees  ain  Bonus
payments  may  in fact  be interpreted  as a device  to vary  wages  according  to the post-investment  productivity
of workers. It is this device,  in addido to the posible influence  of culual factors,  that enables  Japanese
firms  and workers  to maintain  long  term employment  relatonships  that prtec  both prtie'  investment  in
ApprndcWlp  the empirc  evdce
At least  at first sight,  the practices  governing  the determinat  of wages  in reglated apprnticeship
sysems provide  empirical  spport  for the traditional  theory. Even  more striking  evdenc  is provided  by
uneglted  apprenticeship  systems  where  market  forces  are wholly  unfettered.
Repda  wapp  cehup:  Most  govenment-reguated  apprenticeship  sysems  are intended  to provide  broad-
based, t  erable training, Acording to the theowy,  in the absenc of govenment  interntion,  the cost
of the training  shuld mostly  be bore  by  the trainee  and one should  anticpate  that apprentie wages  s  hould
10rise steeply  from a low  level,  following  a cumve  of like  DEFC  in Fiure  1.1. Cetainly  this i  cosiste  ith
the facts.  Usually apprentice wages are set at a fixed proportion of the waes  of qualified workers, th
proporion increasn  according  to the year  of app  ticeaWship.  Exmples are given  In Table 1.1.
On the surface  at least,  the data support  the trditional theory  in two  ways. FhvtK  in al 
apprentice  wages  start at a fraction of qualified  worker' wages  and increase  with the development  of
expertise.  Scond,  the wages  tend to be lowest  in those apprenticeship  sytem  whih  have a ffo
providing  the most intensive  training.
In part  the vaiations in the wages  reflect  differeness  of coveagse.  For  example,  the f  for New
Zealand  are those prescrlbed  for engineering  apprentices,  those for Denmark  give  the ar  ange  for
plumbers,  painters,  typesetters  and electricians,  and those for the United  Kingdom  also refer to a naro
range  of occupations,  whereas  those for the Federal  Republic  of Germany,  Ireland  and Italy  ae  close to
general  averages.
Table 1.
Apprentice  Wages  as % of Qualified  Worker  Wages,
Selected  Countries,  Europe  and Asia and Pacific
Year  of Apprentlcs*l
1  2  3  4
Denmark  (2.)  *  90
Germny  (FRG)  30  35  40
Inld  30  45  65
It*  y5  - 90
UK  40M0  54-70  60-90
Asa,~  Panic
Austral  42  SS  75  a8
NoPais  50  ...  -
New Zealand  4248  5460  6672  784
PakItn  40  .. so.  89
SIPOe  40  so
a Allwance  duing fi-dme  off4-hejob  insw  during  fit  yar.
b  Party  or wholly  Asidized.
Scum=  KOdiz (1921),  APSDEP (1981)
11In pant  they  could  be attrbuted to variations  in the sacrifice aded of the appmetine  ine  lwiteh
the resurces  devoted to his traning.  K6dtz  (1981) cncludes  that in aMember stes  (of th  Europe
Communityl  where apprenticeship  tfaining  contributes highly  towards  the qualification  of workes (DenmarkK
Federal  Republic  of Germany,  Luxembourg) ...  the apprentice's am  as a trainee  is emp  the
proportion  of his productive  labour  is relatively  low,  as are his wags@8,  iDn  iMember  States  where
apprentice  training  contributes  only minimumly  towards  the qual  of wrkers  ..  more  emphasi is
placed  on the status of the apprentice  a  an employee  and at leas to  the end of the apprenticeship  his
material  situation  tends  to be close  or equal  to that of unilled  young  workers. His  accompanying  remarks
indicate  that K6ditz  considers  Italy  and the United  Kingdom  to be examples  of the soond category.
And in part the variations  in apprentice  waes could  be attributed  to labour  market rigidities.  As
K6itz observes,  apprentices  in the United  Kingdom,  far from maldkg  a sacrifice,  may  well  ea  more than
those of the same  age  who  have  directly  entered  unskilled  occupations,  thei generous  compensation  being
the result  of social  and union  pressure  (Prais  and Steedman,  1986). This  is widely  held  to be a major  factor
responsible  for the relatively  poor supply  of apprenticeship  places  in the United  Kingdom  cmpared with
say, France  and Germany  (Jones and Hoilenstein,  1983;  Prais and Steedman,  1966).  In Germany,  by
contrast,  the institutional  pressures  appear  to work  in the opposite  diection:  the obiation  of most  school-
leavers  to secue a training  place  rather than relar  employment  has helped  to acate  and utaina  large-
scale,  low-wage  apprenticeship  system  which  extends  eve to occpadons where appreiceship is hard to
justify  (Dougherty,  1987). At the other extreme  there is the eample of Panama,  where the labour code
requires  apprentices  to be paid nearly  as much  as skilled  worker and not  app_ip  is
practically  monbund  (Cuervo,  1985).
it is a matter  of some  dispute  as to whether  the apprentice  we  llutastmed in Table  1.1  cause
the apprentice  to bear the net  cost of his  training. It is commonly  sai  in Genrany that in many  trades  the
enterprise  makes  a loss on the apprentice  in the first year,  breaks  en  in the secoad,  and makes  a profit
in the third. However, as has been found repeatedly in many counies,  it is impossible  to mease  ne  costs
sufficiendy  reLiably  to test such  propositions.  Indeed  Eckaus  (1963)  obsefves  that measurmment  is impossiole
even  in principle  when  rining  and production  are a jointprocess.  In any case,  firms  seldom  make any
serious  attempt to estimate  them (Oatey,  1970).
Such  formal  studies  as have  been  undertaken  typically  indica  that the overall  net  cosM  to enterpises
is posive (for exmple, in Germany Noll et al, 1983; and teb United  Kingdom:  At  1982). In
some cases,  especially  those imvoving  etensive vestibule  tr  instead  of direct  on-the-job  t*  the
firm  does  undoubtedly  make  a loss  and  the Beckerian  explanation  of  eterrise-based trainDg  provision  must
be etended (see below).  But in others the apparent  net cost may  be attrbuted to biased  accounting
NoD  et aL  (1983),  summarinig  the findian of one of the  most  comprehensive  trn  costs  studies
ever undertaken  (2,141  enterprise 45 occupations),  concude  that trn  cost tend to be systematically
overesfimated  and the net output  of the trainee  systematically  underestimated. Io particular,  the east of
traie0r  time tends  to be greatly  eagerated.  Typically  the ost of a trainer  hour is estimated  using  his  wage
rate, when in fact the real cost, in terms of the lost contibution of the trainer to output,  may be much
smaler.  Indeed if the trainer  is able to fit trai  into  periods  when  he would  otherwise  have  been  idle,
he tu  shadow  cost of traiing is neglgble or zero.  This fleility  apps  to be partcully  important
for sma  firm  in trades and crdts, and help  to exln  t  i  to provide  fow  apprentices
12who  are likely  to move  on to other  sectors  of the econom3r.  it is far more reasonable  to suppoe that such
firms  profit  on balance  ffom  their trainees  than that they  incur  the losses  estimated  in such  studies  (Noll  et
al. 1983; Dougherty,  1987). The tendency  to overestimate  the cost of trainer time and to underestmate
the contnbution  of the trainees may be partly attributable  to genuine  measurement  problems,  but it is
undoubtedly  reinforced  by an undersandable preference on the par  of ente  to be regarded as making
an altruistic  contribution  to the development  of young  people  rather than  benefiting  commercially  from  the
apprenticeship  system.
The alterations that have  gradually  been made to the terms of apprenticeship  are entirely  conssent
with the traditional  theory of apprenticeship.  For example,  dte dropping  of fees by th  Insitute of
Chartered  Accountants  in England  and Wales  in the 1960s  was  a ratification  of a chang that had already
occurred  as a consequence  of obvious  market  forces:  as the profession  has established  itself  in its own  r,
it has managed  to attract  better-educated  recrits, and  because  they  are  better educated,  they  are productive
almost  immediately. As a consequence,  not only  have  the fees been dropped,  but aceountancy  firms  am
able to pay attractive  initial  wages.  Similarly,  and more generaly,  the improvement  in the education  of
apprentices,  pardy  attributable  to extra  years  in school,  has accelerated  their  attainment  of net productivity
and has made  it possible  for employers  to agree  to shorter  training  periods.
Unreguted  eprendceship:  Perhaps  unsurprisingly,  the  traditional  theory  is corroborated  most  btnsparently
by the unregulated  apprenticeship  systems  that have spontaneously  grown all over the world and are
paricularly  widespread  and woell-domented  in West  Afnca (for case studies  and further  references,  see
Sethuraman,  1981; Hallak  and Cailods,  1981; Fluitman,  1987; Harper, 1987). Typicaly  apprentices  in
these systems  receive  only  nominal  pay and may have  to pay fees,  the size  of the fee in such  cases  bearng
a  la  relationship  to the net cost and the vaue. of the training.  For exmple, a Ngerian survey found that
the fees paid by apprentice  motor mechanics  tended to be much greater than those paid by appe
tailors,  reflecting  the greater net cost of traiing mechanics,  the highe incomes  eamned  in that occpation
and the greater chances  for upward  social  mobiliqt  (Allen,  1982).
An alternative  to charging  a fee is to extend  the duration  of the training  artificially  to allow  the
master  to make  a profit,  as is described  in a study  of skill  development  in small  and intermediate  enterprises
in carpentry  and footwear  production  in Tunisia:
The small workshops  are likely  to provide  on-the-job  training  that is
conventional  and complete,  in the sense that apprentices  not only  learn
the  techniques of  the trade but  also acquire practical knowledge
(con  ing procurement  and marketing)  which  will  fit them to become
craftsmen  in their  tunL  The system  is very  selective,  and the low wage
paid  to the apprentice  is the price  he must  pay  in order to leamn  the trade;
i  contra,  the worwksops  of intermediate  size  rapidly  spoal  their
apprentices  in highly  fragenited tasks. This  enables  them  to use a cheap
source  of labor productively  and to pay  the workers  higher  wages,  but at
the pice- of abadoning  appfenticeship in the trade.
he  first type of on-the-job tr  which in a  way represents a
persistene of the traditional  and conventional  form of apprentisip,
13consists in seeling to maximize t  apprnices  producivt  in the long
term;  however,  an employer  who  refrains  from mmamizig  short-term
productiviy in a situation of unrestrained comption  must ne  x
minimize  his labor  cost.  Since  the pursuit  of productivit  in the medium
or long  term calls  for a certain  stability  of the  labor  for  the caftsman's
entire strategy  will  consist  in getting  the appentice to understand  that the
low  wage  he reeives is the price  he has to pay  to leam his trade.  And
the complete  traiing  will be impated only very slwly  - which  i
moreover,  a measure  of good assimilaton - sine it is vey likely  that
the  apprentice will leave his emploer  as soon as  he completes his
training,
'In these cases there isa  very  large initial  turnover  of apprentics who
seek  better pay and who  settle down,  for the time bein  only  when  they
find employers  who  take the second  tpe  of on-thejob training  This
second  qpe consists  in maximizing  short-tem productivity  through  very
rapid and highly  specialized  traini  which  alows the employer  to pay
higher  wages'  (World  Bank,  1985).
Curiously,  in view  of  their economic  importance,  informal  apprentceshp has  larpgy  been  neglected
in official  policymaking,  One factor,  undoubtedly,  has been a failue to reco  its cotnbution to skill
development. Despite  the fac that it may  be the dominan means  of sk  development  for most crafts,
many  planners  in developing  countries  appear  to be barely  aware  of its enistence.  It is  no accident  that most
studies of informal  apprenticeip  have been underaken  by non-gonment  bodies or individuals,  often
foreigners.  Even when  the  documentaton  is  in place,  planners typically take  it  for  granted that
institutionalized  training must be more cost-effective,  or at least more effective,  whereas it may be neither.
Without doubt high priority in the traig  field in many developing ontries  should be given  to  a
comprehense  assessment  of this underworld,  comprising  a quantitative  surwy of its scope and an evaluation
of the degee  to which it substitutes or complements  other forms of skill development
Exesions  of the model of appr  e  nt  ps
Although  experience  with  apprentie pay  gnera  supports  the  traditional  theory  of apprenticeship
and its refinements,  there is endence that the explanaion  provided  by the model can be a serious
oversimplification.  In particular,  it is appareny contradicted  by the not uncommon  finding  that the wages
paid  to apprentices  may  not be inversely  related  to te  cost  of their training  For  exmple, a d  pon
of apprentice  allowances  in Germany  by trade  reveals  that apprentices  in occupations  with  high  training  ceos
actually  tend to be paid more  than those in occupations  with  low  on  (Dougherty,  1987).
The  key to the resolution  of this puadox is a consideration  of the mobility  of the  trainee. Becker's
formulation  of the model  assumes  a competive labour  market  and unrestricted  mobility. As he himself
points out (Becker, 1964, p. 29), to the extent that an enterprise exerfs  monopsony power, general skil
development  becomes  effecively  specfic skill  developmen  and accordinly  will  be financed  by it.
This lifn of reawoing can be develope  in seeal  wayL  First, as Oatey (1970)  points out, the caus
of the immobfilty  is immaterial Whatev  its origin,  aif the firm were certain the  trinee  would ner  leave,
14the question  of the generality  of skills  becomes  irrelevant,  and the firm  could  behave  as if the investment  was
specilc",  as in the lifetime  employment  system in larger firms in Japan.
Second,  an enterprise  may  be willing  to bar  the cost of general skill  development  evmn  if some
trainees  are attracted  to other firms  by higher  wage  offers  and depart  immediately. It is sufficient  that it
should  be able to recoup its investment  by paying  those who  stay behind  wages  below  the market rate.
Several  studies  have  shown  that the costs  of training  can  be recouped  even  if a trained  worker  stayed  on for
only  a short while  after training  (for example,  Ziderman,  1969).  Ryan (1980)  estimates  on the basis of
conservative  assumptions  about  the marginal  product  of trained  welders  relative  to their wages  that a return
of 15 percent would accrue to the firm even if a trained welder quit as early as the fourth ye  of
employment. In the German  study  cited above,  it was concluded  that employers  with high training  costs
hope to recoup  their investment  in the subsequent  employment  of the worker  and they  are prepared  to pay
well  to recruit able individuals,  the premium  wage  being  a very  small  proportion  of the total invement.
Is it realistic  to expect  workers  with transferable  skills  to stay  with the training  firm  despite  being  offered
a wage  below the market rate?  Yes, within  limits,  if there are costs  in moving.  Such costs may  be
monetary  (loss or impairment  of pension  rights; cost of moving  house, if necessary)  or non-monetary
(psychic  cost of overcoming  inerdia; loss  of companionship  at work; loss of seniority  and impairment  of
job security). Potentially  an important  factor  is a temporary  loss  of earings due  to asymmetric  information
among  firms. Katz  and Ziderman  (1987)  argue  that a worker  with  transferable  skills  who  changes  employer
can  expect  to suffer  a cut in wages  for a transition  period  while  his  ability  is being  evaluated  and recognized.
He has no incentive  to move  if the present  value  of the loss of wages  during  this probationary  period is
greater  than the present  value  of the loss  incrred by  staying  with  the  traiing firm  at a below-market  wage.
In this respect  certification  has a negative  impact  on traning,  for by  facilitating  inter-firm  mobility  it reduces
the incentive  for a fm  to provide  training. It is perhaps  significant  that in West  Germany,  one of the few
countries  where tle  acquisition  of higher  credentials  via in-service  training  is well-established  (Maurice,
Sellier  and Silvestre,  1986),  there  are powerful  socio-institutional  constraints  on the competition  among  finns
for trained  workers.
Fmally,  as Oatey  (1970)  observes,  it is rational  for enterprises  to provide  general  traing  if its cost
is exceeded  by that associated  with  the recruitment  of the skill  in the open market.
This last consideration,  together  with the recognion of the role played  by mobility  in training
decisions,  leads  naturally  to the development  of the internal  labour  market model  of Doeringer  and Piore
(1974). According  to this model,  training  is a major  intrument in the management  of the internal  market
of the firm  and the fact that its cost may  be more than  justified  in terms  of reduced  hiring  and fring costs
provides  an explanation  of the willingess  of fwms  to provide  in-service  training  of a pardy  or wholly  general
nature, despite  the fact that such  trainees  are not expected  to accept  lower  wages  for its duration.
The adoption  of such a framework  also makes  it possible  to replace  the simple,  short-term  wage
cept  of compensation  with a long-term  notion  of career development  in which  an explicit  or impUcit
promise  of traing  at appropriate  times,  accompanied  by promotion  and pay increments,  is as much  a part
of the package  as the immediate  earning.  Needless  to say, the problems  involved  in the empirical
investigation  of a compensation  model  on these  lines  are immense  and it appears  that no such  studies  have
been undertaken.
151.  P1avaFteinnced  lm1ntluonldl  lag
Although  enterprise-based  training  is the dominant  source  of sill development  in most countries,
privately-financed  institutional  Waining  is also  significant  in scale  in some. The  rationale  for purchasing  such
braiing is a staigbtforward  extension  of the rationale  for purchasing  privaely-fnanced  education: the
trainee  (or his or her famly) inurs costs  in the form of fees paid  to the institution  and ineome  forgone
during  training and in exchange  receives  benefits  in the form  of higher  earning on comnpleting  the training.
The  decision  to purchase  the training  is rational  if the rate of return  on the investment  exceeds  the available
return  on alternative  investments.
Psoprlety  schw  o  ll
The simplest  type  of privately-financed  institutional  training  is the training  provided  by proprietary
schools,  training  institutions  which  are privately-owned The increing  concern  with husbanding  public
financial  resources  in developing  countries  suggests  that policymakers  should  look  positively  on the potential
contnrbution  of proprietary  schools  to skill  development. Nevertheless,  proprietary  training  is vefy  poorly
documented  in most  countries. Even  in the United  States,  where  proprietary  schools  enrol  nearly  4 million
students  each  year and generate  $4 billion  revenues,  and correspondence  courses  enrol 1.5  mOion  students
and generate  $1  billion  revenues  (Wagner,  1983),  it is only  over  the past 20  years  that such  training  has  been
systematically  surveyed.  The reasons for this neglect  are similar  to those responsible  for the lack of
documentation  of informal  apprenticeship.
Fist, policymakers  and planners,  and even  researchers,  are frequently  unaware  of the scale  of this
type  of training. Quite  typical  ic this respect  is the study  undertaken  by Lukomski  (1978). The objective
of the study  was  to evaluate  the relative  importance  of SENAI  apprenticeship  and short  courses  for training
lathe-operators,  it being  supposed  that apprenticeship  would  be the more  important  mode. In fact  it turned
out that apprenticeship  was  the minority  route and that the majority  of those who  had acquired  their  skills
through  short courses  were not trained  by SEKAI  at all,  but in proprietary  schools:
'Although  it was known  before the study that the proprietary  schools
existed,  it was not realized  that they  were responsible  for 1.7 times as
many  courses  as SENAI ...  The existence  of a "system'  of proprietary
industrial training - relatively  large and with a long history  - was one of
the most important  findings  of the study"  (Lukomslk,  1978).
A second  reason  for the neglect  of proprietary  traiing by policymakers  and planners  is a prejudice
against  it caused  by the profit  motive. They  are concerned  that the schools  are prone to overmarket  their
courses  and to generate  unrealisic  expectations  with  respect  to the  jobs that will  follow  from the training.
They  suspect  that the swhools  provide  inferior  quality  training,  economizing  on inputs. In addition  to these
substantive  criticisms,  there is often  a general  feeling  that the profit  mfoive leads  to the subordination  of
broader  educational  objectives,  and that it  is wrong  for  human  development  to be commercialized.  However,
when these complaints  are well-founded,  the authorities  should consider  remedial  action rather than
discouragement  or prohibition.  Remedial  action  could  include  requirements  that  proprietary  schools  publish
records  of the sucess of their  graduates  in obtaining  employment,  or perhaps,  as a last  resort because  it can
an  doe lead to corrption, reglation.  It is wort  noting  in this context  that th  utions aroused  by
16public training pm  es  ae  ear  any more reliable.  It  is unusual for public trining
establishments  to undertake  placment stuies and to publcize  the reults.
In addition to reducing  the pres  on public secor  riois  p  ion  propnetary schools  can be
more cost-effective  than their public countepars  Public admintoa  sor emes  note wi  dismay the
lack of standardation  of the  ose  sutues  in proprtary  o  both in terms of curilum  and
duration.  Hower  public aoin  nMos  have a vested interest i  stadizaton  since it reduces the
complext  of the world around them and simplifies their work  Hence, for eample,  if a public  traing
establishmet offers cours  in electric installations,  machining and auto mechanics, their duration will by
amazing coinadence be identical,  and by furher  coincidence  it wil Ib an exact number of yeas or half-
year  Moreover, irrespective of any changes in technolo  and the curiculum,  the couse  lengths will
remain invariat  over time.  By contrast, the programmes offered by proprietary schools,  which are often
saller  and more spWalized, typically  exhibit a bewildenng range of duration, sometimes even wihin a
single trade.  This state of affairs could be cosrued  as evidence of the superior organizational  genius of
the managers of the public institutions,  but a more realistic interpretaion in most cases is that the lengths
of tie  propritary  school courses are more closely  tailored to the actual requirements of each occupation
and are adapted to the level of skill demanded by the particular market sewed by it.  Indeed one of the
explaations  advanced  for the co-aexistence  of propretary schools  with competing,  free, community  colleges
in the United States is tat  they ecoomize  on the trainee's time, and are therefore cheaper from the private
as well as the social  viepint  (Wilnms,  1975,  1987).  By reaching the job market sooner, the private trainee
has an opporunity to earn part or all of the fee while the public  trainee finishes his course.
In some counties  it is evident that proprietary schools have the additional merit of being more
reVonsiv  than their public sector counterpas  to changes  he demand for skills.  In Malaysia, for
exmple,  propretay  schools fil  major gps  at the juior  tencian  leve left by the public programmes.
They are tWpically  much more assiduous than pubLic  establshments in mainaiing  close links with local
emplors,  not just for the short-rmu  objective  of placing current tainee  but also for adapting curricula so
that placement rates may be maintained.  And when the demand disappears, the courses are dropped and
the school may even close (Wils,  1987).  By contat,  public traiing  establishments  tend to suffer from
inertia.  In many countries, this is attributable to th  heavy centrazation  of authority.  But even where
public tning  establihments enjoy substanal  autonomy,  their management may  lack incentives  to respond
promptly to local feedback (Castro, 1987).  And as for closing those that have oudasted their usefulness,
the problm  of redeploying  permanent staff often makes it an impossiblity.
Cost-ecovey  In pubik  f  nsng  iodtutions
In many countries public  sector training institutions  have been established  in response  to a perceived
need for the skills provided and a failure of the private sector to meet this need, the failure being caused by
a lack of know-how  or entepreneurial  capacity,  a lack of capital or risk averson.  In developing  countries
suc  instition  are  frequently established with the aid of international donor agencies which provide
technial  epertise  and fundi
The fact that such instions  are publicly  owned does not automaticaly mean that they shoud be
publicly  financed. In principle they could finance themselves  like proprietary schools by charing  user fees
which  cvr  their costs  In practice this is exceptional especially  in developing  countries. In fact the general
ethos rem  aian  ful  cost recovery. In the 1970s those visitng public training centres could usually
17opec to be told,  with  pride,  that no fees,  or only  nonminal  fees,  we  char  Since  then harder  times  have
brought  est-eovy  to the agenda,  and instutions are more ready  to asset that they do charg fees -
but ths  often  turn out to be minima1,  as before.
Part  o  evn  m  il  cost-recovery  can only  be jusified  if ther  is a case for subsidizing  the train
on one or more of the grounds  dicmd  in Chapter  2. Otherwis a failure  to chae  full-cost  fees  wi  lead
to a misalocation  of resources  and to an unney  bwden on the public  purse.  The misallocation  of
resourcs resuts from the price  of taning  not refle  its oose,  wi  the consequence  that socal demand
is artificially  stimulated.  A typical  outcome  would  be unemployment  or the graduates  or their  employment
in jobs not related to their trang.  The unnecessary  burden  on the public budget is patly  caused by tiis
excess  demand,  and parly by the crowding  out of private  provision  of the training.
182  The  t'nontale  for  Govemment  ervention
If traiing  were determined  solely  by market forces,  as in the foregoing  analysis,  would  training
investments  fall short of the social  optimum? Is there a role for goenent  intervention?  From an
economic viewpoint,  the govemment's role can be a  u  in terms of the usual  citeria  of efficiency  and
equity  in the allocation  of resources.  Under efficiency,  two separate reasons  may jusif  government
intervention: imperfect  market  conditions  and externalities.  Under  th  equity  criterion,  subsidies  are often
intended  to improve  the access  to jobs and income,  particularly  among  disadvantaged  groups  in society. In
addition  to the economic  considerations,  government  intervention  may  be justifed on social  grounds. For
example, it may help to prevent sodal disruption  by incucating desirable  values or attitudes or by facilitating
attachment  to the labour  force.
2.1  Market  Fa  and  Related  ProbRems
The term market failure will be used here to cover the consequences of non-profit maximizing
behaviour  on the part of firms  and distortions  attibutable to minimum  wages  and wage  rWidity,  imperfect
capital  markets,  risks  and uncertainty,  and rWdities  associated  with  in-service  trainig.  In principle  the bst
solution  to the problem  of market  failure  is a direct  attack  on its causes,  but this may  not always  be feasible.
First,  the distortion  may  be a side-effect  of policy  which  has been  adopted  for other reasons; seoond,  the
distortion  may not be susceptible  to direct measures.  In either case,  a  second-best  solution  requiring
goveronent  intervention  may  be desirable.
Nonrt-mdmiton  by fim
Firms  may  undertrain  bcause they are not managed  in an economically-rational  manner.  They
may fail to provide  specific  traiing  which  is in their interest, and they may fail to respond  to market
incentives  to provide  general  training.
In practice  it is often  difficult  to teU  whether  a fagure  to provide raining  is economically  irrational
or rationaL Small  firms in particular  may  have  good reasons  for not providing  training  the technology
and administrative  procedures  used by  them may  be so simple  that structured  training  is unnecessary.
Even  if an underprovision  of training  can  positively  be identified,  training  incentives  alone  may  not
be the answer. If the problem  is attributable  to weak management,  it is likely  to be accompanied  by the
use of outmoded  technology,  inadequate  quality  control,  poor book-keeping,  pooT  marketing  and other
shortcomings,  i  which  case the promotion  of training  should  be part of a broader  package.
With  regard  to the training  problem,  the most  satisfactory  measure  would  be some  form  of business
edcation which  would  stimulate  the fims to act in their own  interests. However,  such  measures  may  be
ineffective  Or  their impact  may  be too slow.  In this cas  several  direct  measures  may  be justified: the
provision  of training  in public  institutes,  the encouragement  of firms  to establish  group  or industry  traiig
shemes, and the provision  of technical  assisance  to promote  both  on-the-job  and off-site  skill  development.
The first approach  has been adopted  to some extent  world-wide,  and in Latin  America  no doubt accounts
for the rise of the national  training authorities throunout  the region.
19A closely  related case for intervention  can be made wheu the market fails to  lsad to the
establisment of taiing  intermediaries.  It nay wel be, for exmplc, that a neglect  of training  is merely  a
reflection  of the opportunity  cos of the manaer's time: the  cost  to him  of establishing  an in-hous traiing
scheme  may  outweigh  the likely  benefits. Funher, most  traning ether than on-the-job  training  appears  to
be subject to economies of scale.  These facts, rether than a  lack of fationality  on the, part of small
employers,  probably  account  for the world-wide  finding  that arge firms prvide strued  training  while
small  ones do not.  For exactly  the same  reasons,  small  firms  tend  not to undertake  marketing  R&D,  and
business  with government.
In  princple,  in  this situon,  it ought to  be  possible for training intermediaries to  establish
themselves,  and this may  occur. SENAI,  the Brazilian  training  authority  (the firs to be founded  in Latin
America  and in many  ways  a model  for the rest), was  established  by industry. But if industry  initiative  is
lacking then government  intenention may  be justified.  However,  in this case there should be a presumption
that it should  be self-financing,  unless  the intervention  is partly  justified  on other  grounds  as well.
If the undertrainn  is caused  by the overhead  cost of organizing  training,  technical  assistance
desiped to reduce  'its  cost  may  be justified  For  example,  firms  too small  to ornize  in-house  training  may
be deterred  from  using  off-site  traning by the opportity  cost of the time taken  by the manager  to locate
suitable  off-site  facilities. In this case the government  may  establish  an information  clearing  house  linking
training  providers  and employers. The fact that a private  clearing  house  of this type  recently  established
in Prance  is said to be immensely  profitable  indicates  the potential  value  of such  an interveation  - and that
the operation  might  pay  for itself
ndividual  mnyopla
The counterpart  of non-profit-maAimization  by firms  is the failue of individuals  to take  up training
places  because  they  fail to perceive  the value  of the traiing.  Because  they  underestimate  the value  of the
training.  or bcause they  overestimae  their own  initial  productivity,  they  are not willing  to take up an entry-
level  job at a low  enough  wage  to compensate  the employer  for the cost  of the training. instead  they  take
up jobs which  provide  higher  wages  but litde or no training  opportunities,  or they remain unemployed.
Alternatively,  while  they have an accurate perception  of the value of the training,  they may be unduly
pessimistic  about  employment  prospects  on its termination. For example,  Holister and Freedman  (1988)
report that the low  take-up  on training  schemes  for young  people  in some  OECD  countries  is attrbutable
to such pessimism,  despite the fact that the labour  market for young people is on the point of being
transformed.  In either cas  subsidization  of traiing from  public  funds  might  be a justifiable  response,  but
an alternative  measure  would  be more  effective  vocational  counselling.
hm1m  wagW and  w  dlslons
Whether training is general or spedfic, it must bc financed,  at least partly,  by the worker or
apprentice, in the form of a reduced initial  wag.  Where current productivity  warrants paying  the mnimmI
wag, the provision  of trining would  entail  paying  initially  a subminimum.  Since  this condition  cannot  be
satified in the preseance  of  minimum  wage  legislation,  firms  are discouraged  from  providing  the training.  the
impact  being  weaker  in the case  of specific  training  since  firms  are prepared  to bear at least  part of its cost.
In the curt  on of new minimum wage legislation in the US,  this consideration is probably
20responsible  for the inclusion  of a clause  allowing  employers  to pay  inimum  wages  durig  a period  of
initial  employment.
Leighton  and Mincer  (1979)  note that minimum  wges alo lad  to differential  training  outcomes
across  population  groups.  Those who  are intellectually  and financially  able  to prolong  their  schooling  will
do so, even  if their interests  are pmarily vocationa,  and they  would  have  preferred  job training  to staying
in schoolr  (p. 159). They  specuate that this respose is partly  reflected  in the growth  of junior  coUeges  and
private  vocational  schools,  the growing  importance  of vocational  pro  es in college  curricula,  and the
tendency  to combine  study  and work.  The resut is thus  to shift t  venue  of job training  partly  into the
formal  school  tem. Low  wage  workers  face  greater  difrfiwties:M  loss  of  jos  for those  with  wages  initaly
below  the minimum,  and loss  of traing  oppotunities  even for those  whose  initial  productivity  is worth  as
much  as or somewhat  more than the minimum  wage.  Empirical  evidence  from their sudy confirms  that
minimum  wages  discourage  job training,  the effect  being  most  pronounced  among  people  with  lower  levels
of education.
Restrictions  on wage  lexibility  may also distort the incentives  to invest in traiing.  Such
restictions, often the result of collective  bargaining  activities,  tend to compress  before-and-after-training
wage  differentials,  thus affecing how  the costs  and benefits  of investment  in training  are shared  between
workers  and employers.  Trade unions  seek  to limit  wage  differentiation  for at least  two  reasons: ostensibly
to improve  equity  in pay  among  workers,  equity  being  variously  defined; but more  importantly,  to reinforce
the union's  bargaining  power  (Ryan,  19VW).  By  jacking  up trainees'  wages  relative  to that of experienced
workers,  unions  create incentives  for employers  to hire fewer  trainees.  The stategy thus neutralizes  the
potential  threat that a younger  and cheaper  labour  force  might  pose to incambent  workers
The impact of wage compression  on training  outcomes  is illutated  in a  study  by Prais and
Steedman  (1986)  on vocational  training  in construction  trades  in France  and Britain.  The authors  found
that the number  of youths  attaiing comparable  professional  qualification  in France  was  about  1.7  times  the
number  in Britain,  despite  the fact  that  the industry  was  of comparable  size  in both countries. An important
factor in their view  was the relatively  high levl of trainee  wages  in Britain.  In the 1970s,  second-year
trainees  in Britain  earned,  on average,  about 70 percent  an adult craftsman's  wage,  while  those in France
received  only  about  25 percent  of an adult's  wage. Apprentice  wages  in Britain  have  been  revised  recently,
but even  so, they  were at the time of the study  still  more than double  the French percentage.
What could  be the role of government  when distortions  in the wage structure  diminishes  the
incentives  to invest  in training? The most  obvious  solution  is the removal  of the institutional  obstacles  that
restrict  wae  flexibility.  In particular,  apprentices  may  be assigned  a legal  status  separate  from that of the
regular  labour  force  and exempted  from minimum  wage  legislation. For other workers,  a direct solution
may  be difficlt to implement. Minimum  wages  are often  desired  for various  socia and political  reasons,
and their possible  adverse  effect  on training  may  not outweigh  the importance  of these  other  goals. Under
these  circumstances,  an appropriate  alternative  role for government  interention is more  complex  to define.
Providing  subsidies  to cover  part of trainees'  wages  is a possile (and common)  intervention,  although  no
claim  can be made  on theoretical  considerations  that it is the optimal  intervention  under conditions  of wage
distortion
21Capital  9mae  IMprlons,  rFis and unoertolnty
Becker's  model  predicts  that the cost  of completely  general  training  should  fall  on the trainees,  but
the cost of firm-specfic  training  should  be shared with the employer.  Imperfece  capital  markets  may,
however,  prevent workers from making the invesment, even if it were high  profitable.  Human capital is
seldom acceptable as collateral for borrowing  funds in commercial  markets, so only those who can finance
the cost of direct outlays and of forgone earings  would be able to  take advantage of the  profitable
investment opportunities.  As a result there is likely to be underinvestment in training.
Risk and uncertainty may also be responsible for underinvestment.  Like all other investments,
training costs are incurred in anticipation  of later benefits that may or may not materialize.  The longer the
traiing,  the less certain are the potential benefits,  and the greater the risks of investing.  In this context,
market forces are likely  to yield  a less than socially  optimal  amount of investment  in training because private
risks tend to exceed  the social  risks, the private risks being higher because individuals  lack ways  to diversify
their portfolio of investment in training.
Both of these considerations  can be used as arguments  in favour  of public  support for training,  even
specialized  and expensive  types, on a profit-sharing  basis:  the state shares in the investment  by providing
a  subsidy and  in  return,  under  generally-agreed conditions, recives  part  of the  additional earnings
attributable by the training.  The arrangement comes in two  versions, one in which  the state takes an equity
stake in the human capital generated, and the other in which  it effectively  purchases a bond.  Both versions
apply to general education as well as to training and have been extensively  discussed in the literature on
financing  education (for example, see World Bank, 198I).
Equity  appmach:  In countries with taxes  on personal income,  the provision  of subsidized  education  and non-
firm-specific  training at all levels can in principle be justified by the fact that those who benefit from the
training earn higher incomes and pay more tax  The increment in the tax is the return on the equity stake
represented by the subsidization.  The bargain is attractive in principle, not least by virtue of its simplicity,
but it is inevitably  a crude one with obvious  shortoming
First, it is not applicable  in those countries without  well-developed  income tax systems  or where the
system  is prone to manipulation - in other words, most developing  countries and not a few higher-income
ones as welL  Second, there is no evidence that tax rates or their degree of progressiveness  have in any
country been determined with a view to recovering  educational  investment on the part of the state.  Third,
those who earn  higher incomes by virtue of native ability, industry, private education or good fortune
invariably have to pay the same rates of tax as those who earn them by virtue of exdended  subsidized
education.  Fourth, the justfication of the arrangement loses its force when individuals  treat training as
consumption and/or when they take-up low productivity  occupations.  Fifth, by increasing  the gap between
pre-tax and  post-tax earnings, the  funding of education from direct  personal taxation aggravates the
inefficiencies  associated with the latter.
Bond apprach:  A system  of student loans is an alternative investment-sharing/profit-sharing  arrangement
whUi is less susceptible  to some of these criticisms,  especially  in the strict form where the trainee undertakes
to make definite payments of interest and repayments of capital according to a predetermined and fixed
schdule:  it does not penalize those who have not received subsidized  trainig;  it discourages  the use of
raini  as consmption  (which  can be a serious problem, for professional  training as well as for education:
in several major developing  countries,  social  custom  causes even  professionally-trained  women to retire from
22the labour  force  on marriage); it discourages  ineffiient  choices  of o  pion;  and it does  not add to the
welfare losses associated with  direct taxation. The main weakness  with  the sysem (apart from the problems
of administering  it and losses  due to default)  is that it responds  to only  one of the reason for intervention
*  imperfections  in the capital  market.  It does not address  the problem  of risk-aversion,  since  the risk
remains  the responsibility  of the individual.
Consequently,  in some  versions  the arrangement  is altered  so that the risk is shared  with  the state,
or even  wholly  borne by it:  payment  of interest  and repayment  of capital  is contingent  on the level  of the
future  income  of the trainee. But this weak  version  allows  some  of the other  problems  to reappewr freed
from a necessity  to raise his income  to repay the loa,  the indiaidual  can afford to treat trainit  as
consumption,  and to select  an inefficient  occupation. Further,  the income-ontingent  provision  artificialy
raises  the effective  marginal  rate of taxation  in much  the same  way  as some  income-support  schemes  at low
levels  of income.
Notwithstanding  these problems,  the bond approach,  especially  in its weak version, is being
increasingly  entertained  as a means  of increasing  access  to training,  especially  professional  training,  while
husbanding  financial  resources.
There are other t!ieoretical  solutions  to the problems  of capital  market imperfections  and risk
aversion. For example,  Friedman  (1962)  has proposed  a privately-financed  version  of the equity  approach:
an investor  would  advance  the funds  needed  to finance  the training  on condition  that the traAee agrees  to
pay in return  a specific  fraction  of his future  earningq 'In this way,  a lender  would  get back  more  than  his
initial  investment  from relatively  successfl individuals,  which  would  compensate  for the failure  to  eoup
his  original  investment  from the unsuccessful"  (p. 103). Atternatively,  Gunderson  (1974)  has  suggested  that
a risk averter  could  reduce his risks  by entering  a collective  ageement with others to share the cost and
benefits  of training  under the assumption  that failure  in riame  investments  will  be offset  by  success  in odhes
However,  the formidable  difficulties  involved  in such  schemes  render  them of doubtfWl  practicablity. Not
least  would  be the problem  of identifying  the changes  in earnings  attributable  to a given  train  intervention.
In econometric  studies, the personal  characteristics  of an individual,  induding education  and trainig,
typically  account  for less than half  of the variance  in earning  It would  therefore  be dangerous  to cradit
a training  intervention  with the whole  of a subsequent  increase  in income.
Firms  also  invest  in training,  but they  are less affected  by capital  marke,t  failure  and riskiness The
possibilities  for diversifying  the investment  portfolio  are  greater,  and training  expenditure  is generally  a very
small  proportion  of the total labour  cost.
The provision  of In-serwce  taining
The term in-service training can be used to cover both training provided by enterprises aimed at
improving  directly  the productivity  of their employees,  and training itiated by the employee  and usually
undertaken  independently  of the enterprise.  Here the term will  be restricted  to the fir  cateory,  the
second  type of in-service  training,  which  is usually  descnbed  as recurrent  education,  will  be considered  in
the next  subsection.
Much  in-service  training  is provided  by firms  voluntarily  for firm-spefic purposes. Being  firm-
specific,  it does  not raise  the value  of the employee  to competitors  and so the firm  does  not need  to incease
his pay,  or can  afford  to offer  an increase  which  is lower  than  the gain  in productivity.  In this  way  it recoups
23its investment. In the case of transferable  training,  the basic  theory  holds  that if labour  is mobile  the firm
should  shift  the cost of the training  to the employee  by reducing  his  wages  during  the training  period. While
this may be feasible in the case of apprentices,  it is usually  impracticable  in the case of experienced
employees. If the firm  offers  transferable  training,  and then fails  to raise  pay in line with  productivity,  it
risks losing  not only  the new investment  in gen ral training  but also all its previous  investment  in firm-
specific  training.  Some general  training  may  be provided  by firms involuntarily  because  it is inseparable
from production  (Eckaus,  1963),  but, otherwise  training  in transferable  skills  will  tend to be underprovided.
In a  coordinated  market economy  the problem  may be mitigated  by tacit agreements  among
enterprises,  sustained  by the influence  of such institutions  as chambers  of commerce,  not to poach  each
other's  workers. In the U.K no such  moderating  mechanism  exists  and labour  markets  are competitive.
Competitive  labour markets  may confer  short-run  benefits  in that they  lead to an efficient  allocation  of
existing  skills,  but experience  seems to show  that such  benefits  are outweighed  in the longer  term by the
additional  skill  development  encouraged  by German-style  imperfections. In Germany  firms  can treat in-
service  training  as one of their core activities,  whereas  in the U.K it remains  a peripheral  one, and as a
consequence  German  firms  are much  better placed  for product  or process  innovation. In this  respect,  the
German  employment  and training  framework  has much  in common  with that obtaining  in the larger firms
in Japan.  This problem  calls  for government  intervention  in the case  of countries  with  competitive  labour
markets - for example,  grants to cover  the cost of the transferable  part of in-service  training.
Access  to recurrent education
Recurrent  education  (broadly  defined  as "a global  system  containing  a variety  of programmes  which
distribute  education  and training  ... over  the life-span  of the individual  in a recurring  way  that is alternated
with  work  or other activities,  Stoikov,  1975,  pp. 5-6) - also tends to be underprovided.
Where individuals  can obtain general training in their own time, for example,  in an evening
programme,  there is in principle  no problem:  they can be expected  to take rational  self-investment
decisions,  as in the case of pre-employment  proprietary  education.  If circumstances  are favourable  (in
particular,  if mobility  is low  and the absence  of the worker  does not disrupt  output),  firms  may  be willing
to absorb or subsidize  the direct costs  and grant  leave.  However  if circumstances  are not favourable,  an
existing  worker has fewer options than an apprentice  undergoing  initial training.  In particular,  it is
extremely  unusual  for an existing  worker  to be able  to compensate  an enterprise  for reduced  productivity
or disruption  during  the training  period  by temporarily  accepting  a low  wage.
This rigidity  may  be regarded  as a special  case of market failure  which  may  justify  government
intervention,  financial  or legislative.  In practice,  no country  has  yet  achieved  a full-scale  system  of  recurrent
education,  although  elements  of it do exist  in some countries. The extent  of public  funding  tends to vary
between  countries,  and employers  are often  legally  obliged  to share  part of the cost  of recurrent  education.
In Sweden,  study  grants are available  from  central  government,  but few  people  take up the option  of study
leave  because  funds  are limited.  In France,  employers  are required  by law to provide  paid educational
leave,  mostly  for vocational  training,  but participation  is biased  towards  male  skilled  workers  in large  firms.
In Germany,  workers  and employers  are obliged  by law  to coutribute  2 percent  of fixed  monthly  earnings
24towards  the friancing  of vocational  training,  but here also illed workers enefit  disproportionately  (Blaug
and Mace,  1977).
Examples  of large-scale  provision  of recurrent education  are rare in developing  countries,  but
Thailand's  Sukhothai  Thammathirat  Open  University  appears  to have  a sgnificant  impact,  judging  by  the siz
of its clientele.  Opened  in 1978,  its emphasis  has from the start  been on life-long  education.  It had 115,70D
students  in 1989,  about 18  percent of all higher  education  students,  most of whom  were shown  by a survey
(STOU, 1989)  to be working  adults  wishing  to upgrade  their skills. Many  are goverment employees
enrolled  under  joint programmes  set up by the University  and individual  public  agencies. About  two  thirds
of the operating  costs  are recovered  from fees paid  by students,  mosly fiom their current  ean  i
Levin and  SchOtze (1983b) point out that  in principle one  could make a  case for subsidizing
recurrent  education  if it had a cooling  out effect  on the demand  for higher  education. At present,  they
argue, the fact that initial  education  is such an important  determinant  of the future  life chances  of the
individual  leads to social  pressure for provision  on a scale which  exceeds  the social  optimum,  with the
consequence  that the rate of return to much  initial  education  is low.  The establishment  of a system  of
recurrent  education  could  take some  of the heat out of the initial  competition  and reduce  the welfare  loss
attnrbutable  to over-provision.  However,  as Levin  and Schfitze  themselves  point  out, the cooling  out effect
might not be significant: at present,  the scope for upgrading  througb recurrent education  is strongly
influenced  by the initial  job and this  would  still  be primarily  deternined  by  initial  education. This negative
conclusion  is reinforced  by the fact that, as many studies  have found, recurrent  education  and initial
education  tend to be complements,  not substitutes.
Perhaps the strongest  argument  in favour  of subsidizing  recurrent  education  is the simplest  it
should receive  the same support as any other form of general skill  development  and not be subject  to
(negative) discimination
22  Exterlitles
Externalities  eiist when  the benefits  of training  to society  exceed  those  that accrue  to private  firms
and individuals.  Since they are unable to capture all the benefits,  they will underinvest  in trainin&
Economic  theory  indicates  that in order to reach the socially  optimal  volume  of training  investment,  the
government  should  provide  subsidies  for training,
The case for public  subsidization  of training  requires  closer  examination  of the externalities  that
training  schemes  are thought  to generate. The five  main types  which  feature  in the literature  and project
documents  are the breaking  of bottlenecks  in production,  the development  of a pool  of skiled workers  to
encourage industrialon,  the raising of skill development  standards, improvement  in  the use of
underemployed  manpower,  and the reduction  of inflation. In the discusion that follows,  it is not disputed
that each  of these  objecives  is desirable,  other things  being  equaL The question  is whether  it is  justifiable
to devote  more resources  to these  objectives  than would  be allocated  by prvate decision-making  acting  on
its own.  And if there is a discrepancy,  whether  it is attnbutable  to the inability  of an individual  or an
enterprise to capture fuy  the benefits of the skill  development,  that is, to a genuine exernality.
In addition to the five main types, it is commonly  asserted that there is a six,  negative eldernality.
untdrinvestment in transferable traiing  caused by non-training firms poaching qualified  workers from the
25firm6 that trained them.  This supposed externality  may be descrb  as th  poaching illusion and is in fact
based on nothing  more than a failure  to understand  the incidence  of training  costs,  as will  be dsed
below.
DBotleneek-breang
The commonest  type  of externality  argument  is the assertion  that a shortage  of workers  with  key
skills  is responsible,  or, more usually,  is about  to be responsble,  for a reduction  in the rate of growth  of the
economy  and hence an increase  in their numbers  woWld  confer benefit out of all proportion  to their
earnings. It appears  far more often  in the project  docments of donor agencies  than in the professional
literature  and it usually  is unsubstantiated:  judging  by the lack  of compelling  evidence,  authentic  examples
of genuine  externalities  of this type  are hard to find (Castro,  1988). Where  shortages  are identified,  they
are much  more likely  to have  their origin  in market  failure  (see below).
The reason for this is that most  types  of skill  development  can  be effected  at relatively  short notice
as a reglar part  of the investment  process. In particular,  skill  requirements  asscated with  the introduction
of new technology  can generally  be made good as an integral  component  of the transfer  of technology,
whether  it involves  the importation  of a single  machine  or the construction  of a fertilizer  plant (Dougherty,
1989,  Chapter  8).  Provided  that there exists  a supply  of trainable  labour,  the actual  training  process  is
normally  a straightforward  and uncontentious  matter.
The development  of a pol  of skilled  abour
A second  type  of demand-related  externality  argument  asserts  that it may  be desirable  to ceate a
pool  of skilled  workers  in excess  of anticipated  requirements.  There  are two  versions  of this argument,  which
might  be termed  active  and passive. The  passive  version,  put forward  by Gunderson  (1974),  is an exension
to traning of Weisbrod's  (1964)  argument  that society  may  be willing  to pay for the option  to use a service
in the future because  it may  be extemely  valuable  if needed.  In essence,  it amounts  to taking  out an
insurance  policy  against  potential  bottlenecks  and is similar  to the eternality just discussed  The active
version  argues  that it is desirable  to subsidize  training  to improve  the in  ture  for investent, either
by  local  enterpries, or, frequently  in the  case  of developing  countries,  multinationals,  the subsidization  being
justified  because  it can  lead to an increase  of effective  demand,  and hence  utilization  of domestic  resources,
which  would  otherwise  not have  taken  place.
The passive  version  clearly  has merit  for military  contingencies.  But for most  civilian  purposes  the
same objection  can be made to both the passive  and active  versions  as in the case of the bottleneck
externality8  skill requirements  can generally  be made good in real-time  (that is, during the investment
process)  if there exists  a trainable  labour  force. In this  case  the objection  is reinforced  by  the fact  that most
skill atrophy  if not used  immediately  and hence  most training-in-advance  on the lines  advocated  would  be
wasted.  An intervention  which  is much  more likely  to be effective  is the creation  of a mediating  agency
the expertise  (knowledge  of local labour supply,  training establishments,  and legislation)  to
organize  appropriate  training  as required. A much  stronger  argument  can be made  for subsidizing  such  a
catalyst  and several  U.S.  states  have  created  -start-up  agencies  on these  lines  (Dougherty,  1989,  Chapter  8).
Tbe success  of this approach  is likely  to depend, not on a stock of pre-trained  labour, since this is
26unnecesary, but on a stock of trainable  labour,  in other words,  sill  dlopment  should  bi  directed
towards  general  and broad technical  educational,  rather to occupational  trWaing
Th  rising  of  hlB devlopment  Stan
it is often aissrted  that the quality  of traiing  provided  by market frevs  leaves  much to bi deded
and that the government  should intervene  to improve  it.  The arment  is nvr  exprsd  in term  of
externalities  and often  amounts  to little  more than a desire  that evey good and service  should  be the best
of its kind,  regardless  of economic  cost.  But an argment can be pieced  together  on the following  lines.
The starting point is Eckaus's (1963)  observation that most enterprises involuntarily  provide  training in the
course of their normal  operations,  even  if there is no explicit  intention  to do so:  production  and traning
are a joint process.  Enterprises  can capture  part of the value  of the training  by getting  the trainees  to
accept  lower  wages,  but they  cannot  capture  all of it.  They  can make  the trainee  pay  for the value  of the
traning which  will  lead  to higher  future  for him,  but they  cannot  make  him pay for the spillover
effect  he will  eventually  have  on the quality  of the training  received  by those  he involuntarily  trains  in tunL
Hence,  so this argument  might  go, there is a discrpancy  between  the social  and private  valu of trining
which  justifies  subsidization.
In principle,  however,  the discrepancy  will  be eliminated  if die  training  function  of the  skMed  worker
is recopized and his eanings are increased  accordily.  This  allows  the rainee to internalize  the ful value
of his  training  and hence  in turn allows  the firm  to make  him  pay  for  it, by acepting a further  coreponding
reduction  in his wages  during  training. This seems  to be the dsuaton in parts  of the German  apprenticeship
ssZtem,  where the meiter  has a higher  status and pay tha  an ordiay  skied  worker.  If the trainiW
function  of the skilled  worker  is not  fully  c  A as is  often  the aelsewhere,  the  discrepancy  will  not
be eliminated. In such  cases it might  be more corrc  to attribute  the problem  to market  failure  than to
a true externality,  but this technicality  does  not detract  from the cas  for govenmnent  interention.
Improved  utlizaion of underemployed  manpo
The case for subsidized  training  is sometimes  also based on the blief that tran  pigr  es
contribute  to a more  efficient  use of manpower  resources  by increasing  the  employability  of  job-seekers  who
would  otherwise  be unemployed  or underemployed,  or by enhancing  the mobility  of workers  whose  narrow
or excesswe  spealization  has locked them  into low-productivity  jobs or localities.
In the industrialized  countries  the employabty agumen  is usually  addressed  to disadvat
groups  or displaced  workers  In developing  countries  where  the labour  force  is growing  faster  than  jobs  are
being  generated it is commonly  used  to justify  the  wholesale  vocationalization  of education. The benefits
of the intervention  are psychic  benefits  to the individual  who finds  workl,  improved  social  cohesion  and
inreased output,  which  may  result  in a compensatig  reduction  ;U  welfare  expenditure.
Subsidization  can be justified  only  if skill  development  does lead to a net increase  in employment
and should  supplement  rather than displace  the traing  that would  be undertaken  privately  as a result of
market fores.  The literature  on spill-over  (replacement  and  displacement)  employment  effecs is revewed
in Ziderman  (1975b,  1978). A simple  version  of the argument,  based  on Johnson  and Layard  (1986), can
be presented  as follows: suppose  that workers  who  have  received  a particular  qpe of training  earn  a wage
w, and are in short supply,  while those who have not been trained eam a wage w. and a proportion a of
27them are unemployed  If there is a sufficient  turover  of jobs, any given worker in the second category  wi
ean  on average a wage (.u)  w0, and  accofdingly the gain  on being trained is  [w-lu)wj.  This is lower
than the social  benefit  of the trainng. Switching  an individual  from the untrained  category  will  not reduce
the total output  of the type  of labour,  while  it will  still lead to an increase  of output  equal  to w, . Hence
the social  benefit  is simply  w, . Consequently  the social  rate of return  to the training  may  be much  greater
than the private  rate of return (see Ziderman,  1975a,  for an example),  and this may  justify  a subsidy.
The case  can  in fact  still be made  even  if it maumed  that there is Wttle  turnover  of workers  in the
untrained  category,  if the losers  in the competition  for  jobs are in some  way  disadvantaged.  In principle,
the unemployed  workers  should  seek training  and the private  benefit  would  be equal  to the social  benefit
(and there would  be no case for a subsidy).  But in practice,  this outcme  may be thwared by the fact th
the unemployed  are untrainable. I£  this is true, there is a case  for subsidizing  the training  of an employed
untrained  worker,  so that he will  leave  behind  him a job which  can  be filed by one of the disadvantaged
unemployed. The private  benefit  of the training  is (w, - wo),  whereas  the total social  benefit  is  w, , and the
fact that the social  rate of return  exceeds  the private  rate again  justifies  a subsidy.
If there is no shortage  of workers  in the trained category,  the externality  argument  loses  its force.
Indeed  it can work in reverse,  for there is no soci  benefit  when  the number  of unemployed  untrained
w--kers is  reduced  at  the  expense of  increasing the  number  of unemployed trained workers (the
displacement  effect). Under these  circumstances,  the training  is,  in the  terms  of Thurow  (1980),  a zero-sum
activity- the trained worker obtains his job at the expense of somebody  else.  Thurow's analysis  refers to
job-training  programmes  in the US., but it applies  equally  well to the vocationalization  movement  in
developing  countries  (Dougherty,  1989). Clearly,  much  depends  on whether  the unemployment,  or lack  of
it, in either category  is expected  to be temporary  or long-lasting. For this reason,  programmes  directed
towards  improving  the future  trainability  of  workers  and hence  the future  flexibility  in their deployment,  like
the BEST  programme  in Singapore,  are more likely  to be effective  than those developing  specific  skillk
And the most cost-effective  intervention  of all may  be the upgrading  of general  education.
The mobility  argument  obviously  has its merits  but it too can lead  to an overstatement  of the case
for subsidized  training: as Mehmet  (1970)  points  out, it fails  to recognize  that increased  labour  mobility
also imposes  a cost on society,  such as the opportunity  cost of time lost in the move  between  jobs and
localities,  and the cost of recruitment  and termination  of employment
Reduction [n Infladon
According  to one argument  cited  by  Mehmet  (1970),  training  schemes  can  help  to reduce  the  overall
rate of inflation  in the economy  without  raising  the level  of unemployment.  It is assumed  that the market
mechanism  does not bring about a smooth  and speedy  adjustment  of the labour  force to changes  in the
composition  of demand. As a result,  a mismatch  arises  between  the supply  of and demand  for labow, so
that displaced  job-seekers  coexist  with unfilled  vacancies. Left on their own,  market forces  would  restore
equilibrium only in the long-run.  A faster readjustment  would require short-run stabilization  policies,  but
these  would  lower unemployment  at the cost of inflation. A strict trade-off  can, however,  be avoided  by
providing  subsidies  to encourage  more traning investments:  training  schemes  can be designed  to enhance
the adaptability  of labour,  so improving  the reconciliation  between  price stability  and unemployment.
28A variant  of the  inflation  argument  has  been  advanced  by Dorinanad  I  Pione  (195) in die conte
of internal  labour  mukets.  Finms  can adjust  to imbalances  in labou marksek  conditions  through  at least
eleven  instruments,  inlduding  changes  in wage  and nonwage  comprno,  jjob  strutures  reuvent  and
screening  procedures,  and training  invesments. Some  adjusment  inwets  appear  capable  of  generating
continual  cost increases  [that]  would  account  for obsrved relationships  betw  he level  of unemployment
and the rate of inflation'  (p. 197).  Since  training  programmes  tend to bave  less effect  on inflation,  they
argue  that these programmes  should  be subsidized.
The foregoing  argument  is theoretically  attractiva,  but whether  it  justifies  etensive souidization  of
training programmes  is open to question.  Mehmet (1970)  notes, for example,  that other forms of
government  intervention  - such  as dired job creation,  and promotion  of capital  inflow  - may  also  affed the
inflation-unemployment  trade-off.  Thus, subsidies  for traing  would  be justified  only if they are more
effective  in bringing  about  a better trade-off. In recessionary  periods,  they  are  unlikely  to be more  effective,
since  the  basic  problem  is a lack  of jobs rather  than  a lack  of people  with  adequate  training. In some  cases,
even  if subsidies  for training  were available,  the incentive  to train would  remain  weak if job prospects  are
bleak.  The low uptake on subsidized youth traing  opportuniies  in Brkain. for example, has been partly
linked  to the perception that jobs are scarce (Ryan, 1984b). The related argument of Doeringr  and Piore
for subsidized training is also open to question:  the subsidies would distoRt  the incentives  facing  the firm
in deciding  among alternative adjustments  to changes in the external market, and it is unclear whether losses
in allocative  efficiency  would be offset by the social benefit of reduced ifaon.
Tlle poacilUUSIon
There is a widespread  belief  that when  a worker  transferable  skils leaves  the firm  that
trained  him  or her and takes  up employment  wih another,  the training  firm  incws  a loss  and the 'po  ang'
firm  receives  a windfall  benefiL This has often  been  cited as a ground  for Xgovernent  intervention. The
traditional  theory  of apprentice  wages  shows,  however,  tha4 if the relevant  labour  markets  are competie,
the beLief  is groundless. The training  firm  incs  no loss  because  it has shifted  the cost of the training  to
the trainee.  The new  employer  makes  no windfall  benefit  because  it has to pay the  ul market  wage.
These  conclusions  remain  unchanged  when  the analbsis  is broadened  to consider  the development
of nontransferable  and well  as transferable  skills,  the contribution  of Bcker.  They  may  however  need  to
be modified  when  market imperfections  and other  departures  from  the competitive  model  are considered
For example,  as noted  above,  minimum  wage  legislation  may  make  it impossible  for the  traiing firm  to shift
the  cost  of training  to the trainee. In this case,  the obvious  remedy  is to exmpt trainees  from  the legislation.
f this  isnot  feasile,  it may  be desirable  for  the  govemment  to pay part of the trainees wages,  eiher
directly  or through  a device  which  has an equivalent  effect  But even  in this example  it would  be wrong  to
brand non-training  firms  as "poachers.  They  do not benefit  from the market  imperfetion, for they  sti
have to pay the trained worker his or her full market wag.  The only  party that benefits is the trainee, who
receives  the training  at less sacrifice  of income  durng the training  period  than would  have  been the case
without  the minimu  wage  legsation.
2923  Eutity Concrnsest
Apart from  externalities  and possible  market  failure  in the provision  of training,  concern  for equity
is another  reason that may  justify  government  intervention. In many  countries  both secondary  and higher
education  are heavily  subsidized  from  public  funds,  the government  paying  part or all of the direct  cost and
sometimes  providing  a student  stipend  in addition. Whatever  their  merits  on other  grounds,  such  subsidies
constitute a major source of inequity among individuals,  for they benefit precisely  those who have the best
prospects  for employment,  income  and status on entering  the labour force.  Furthermore,  they help to
transmit  inequality  from one generation  to the next,  for the students  who  survive  longest  in the educational
system  tend to come from those families  which  are most able to provide  supplementary  resources  for
education  and to forgo  their potential  earnings  while  in schooL
One of the more obvious  ways  of mitigating  the problem  is to extend  the system  of subsidies  to
forms  of skill  development  other than general  education,  and this is common  in developing  countries. It
is fair to say, however,  that the motivation  has usually  been the promotion  of employment  or economic
growth  rather than a concern  to redress  inequity.  Hence,  for example,  vocational  education  is provided  in
the belief that it can serve to mitigate  the problem  of youth  unemployment,  and occupational  training  is
provided  in response  to a supposed  impending  shonage  of "critical  skils.
The main issue,  however,  is not the motivating  factor,  since  this is immaterial,  but whether  the
extension  of subsidies  to training  truly reduces  inequity  or whether  it in practice  creates another small
privileged  section  of society.  The proportion  of young  people  benefiting  from training  programmes  is
invariably  small in developed  and developing  countries  alike, because  the proportion  of jobs requiing
extended  training  is much  lower  than seems  to be generally  assumed. A U.S. study  using  data from the
National  Longitudinal  Survey  of the High School  Class of 1972  found  that only 5% of the labour force
entered  occupations  requiring  six  months  or more  of training  (Sherman,  1983).  The figure  might  be higher
elsewhere,  but it is inconceivable  that it could  be more  than a very small  proportion. The crucial  factor,
therefore,  is the social  origin  of the trainees.  For simplicity,  the following  discussion  is confined  to craft
training.
Higher-Income  countrIes
In the developed  countries  and some of the developing  ones the scholarity  ratio for recadary
education  is so high that the craft  trainees  tend to be drawn  from the least advantaged  in terms  of ability
and family  resources. In such  countries  the equity  argument  for subsidizing  training  is strong  and the main
issue is whether  it is possible  to move  away  from institution-based  fundirn,  which  tends to be inequitable
because  people who manage to enter high cost programmes get more subsidies than others who are either
ineligible  or unable  to enter such  programmes,  towards  an individual-based  system  of financing,
Levin  (1977)  has proposed  a scheme  in which  public  support  for training  would  be channelled  to
students  in the form of a promissory  note or entitlement. Entitlements  could  comprise  grants and loans,
the mix  depending  on a person's  financial  and backround, and typ  of traning.  Entitlements  would  be
useable  over a person's  lifetime,  the unused  portion  being  refundable  at a persons  retirement. Any  traning
WWhisiom  that meet  the government's  eligbiity  criteria  could  accept  students  with  entidements,  and  redeem
30them for cash from the treasury. An importat iWgrediea  of this system  is government  spoa  stp  of an
information  and  regulatory agency to  provide daa  on  training alte  stheir  costs, programee
descriptions,  graduate  performances,  and job prospgcs.  This individualbasld  system  achieves  a more
equitable distrbution  of pub,ic funding for ftring  bes  the subsidie apopriated  by each person is
determined  acowrding  to his personal  economic  cAr  maances, not by the te  of programme  he succeeds
to enter.
Such a system  of financing  has not been fully  implemented in any country.  One problem is the
possibly  onerous task of evaluating  each person's entitlemeot.  In the United States and United Kingdom,
the concept of individually-based  entitlements has been extensively  d  u  (under the tidtles  of Individral
Traiing  Account and Individual  Training Credit respectively),  and a government-commissioned  report in
the United  Kingdom  has suggested  that an entitlement  scheme  would  be feasible  in practice  (Coopers  and
Lybrand,  1985). And  McMahon  (1987)  has  argued  - illutrating his analysis  by showing  how  an individual-
based scheme  of post-secondary  scholarships  would  operate  in Indonesia  - that the practical  difficulties  of
deterning  awards  on an individual  basis  are surmountable,  even  in developing  countries. Nevertheless
the straightforward  subsidization  of institutions  remains  the rule.
The arguments for subsidizing  initial  training in such countries apply  equaly to subsidizing  recurrent
training  for the least  skilled  and least-educated  workers. However  the strength  of the argument  is blunted
by the  fact  that the cost-effectiveness  of such  training  is often  low. Those  who  are illiterate  or barely  literate
tend to have  a low absorptive  capacity  - which  of course accounts  for the finding  in many  countries  that
they tend to be passed  over by employers  for on-the-job  training  (Nollen,  1976)  - and they  tend to have
lower motivation,  even for the adult literacy  programmes  which  might  have greatest  long-term  impact:
adults  from underprivileged  homes  are often the least willing  to take up education  since  they are the very
ones  who dropped  out earliest  from the formal  system  (Blaug  and Mace,  1977).
L,4er icome countries
By  contrast,  in the lower-income  countries  where  the scholarity  ratio for  secondary  education  is low,
the subsidization  of training  can actually  have  an adverse  effect  on equity. Budgetary  constraints  tend to
cause  the limited  resources  available  for subsidizing  training  to be concentrated  in a few  public  programmes.
While  some of these programmes  may  be addressed  to basic  literacy  and nuzneracy,  most  funds  tend to be
channelled  to more sophisticated  training  for which  completion  of at least lower  secondary  schooling  is a
prerequisite.  The effect, therefore,  is to improve  the prospects  of those who, if not among the most
privileged,  nevertheless  are relatively  advantaged,  and the inequity  is exacerbated  if the provision  of this
training,  normally  expensive,  is at the cost of not enhancing  the coverage  and quality  of primary  education.
2  oial  ¢concern
It may  be argued  under certain  circumstances  that training  may  benefit  society  at large as well  as
the individuaL  The benefit to society  may  be regarded  as a social  eternality akin to the economic
externalities  discussed  in Section  2.2,  and accordingly  may  be used to justify  government  subsidy  or other
intervention.
31Thing  proffmmes  deid  to miigae unemployment  are commonly  held  to benefit  socieq  by
rducn  the threat caused  by unemployment  to the social fabric.  in higher income countries  swme
programmes  addressed  to the log-term unemployed  and minority  groups  appear to be at leas partly
motiaed  by this consideration (for  xamples,  se  Hollister and Freedman, 1988). lntervefntion  is generalyl
justified on equity  grounds, but the presumed social  benefits (for eample, seduction  in the incidence  of drug-
abuse and criminality)  may also be a spur.  In some  developing  countries  the threat of mass youth
unemployment  and consequent  pohlitcal  unre  has elarly ben  at least  partly  responsble  for the uncritical
political  support  for the voctionalization  of secondary  education  (Dougherty,  1989).
A second  ojective which  may  be held  to jusif  intervention  is te  modification  of the values  or
beliefs  of the trainees  in a socially-approved  diretion.  Fo  exmple,  it is sometimes  said that the continued
support  given  by German  employers  to the dual system  is attnrbutable  to its part in creating  an amaenable
labour force:
'As part of the social  framework,  employers  are keen to exercise  their influence  over the
young  generation  at the critic  stage  when  young  people  move  from  school  to worl.  They
resist  fiercely  when  they  might  be dislodged  from  the driving  seat  and they  will  do so even
at great expense  to themlves.  In 1976,  for intance, employers  blocked  proposals  to
amend the 1969  Act in order to spread the cost of training  more equally  througb a
levy/grant  system.  Employers  feared  that such a measure  wold reduce their influence
over the wider purposes  of apprentice  trainng.  This is because  VET has in their eyes
many purposes in addition to that of conveying  occupational  competence.  It encourages
good work babits, a lasting concern for the quality of work done, a flexible  approach to
change, co-operation at work, wiingnews to accept responbilit  and  to  display self-
reliance.  Beyond that its purpose is to give people, and especally young people, a status
and therefore a stake in societyW  (Hayes, Anderson and Fonda, 1984,  p. 12).
For obvious reasons, offcial policy  statements on these lines are hard to find.  But an explicit  example is
provided by the handbook published by the Malaysian  Ministry of Youth and Sports, which states that its
training programme is addresed  to potentially-disaffected  drop-outs (and fr  this reason contains a month
of paramiity  traning).
2.5  Conclusions
The  foregoing  sections  present  some  of the more  important  arguments  for government  intervention
aimed  at promoting  trainig.  Clearly,  the relevance  of each argument  will  vary  from country  to country
according  to  the soioonomic  context and, most paricularly, the functioning  of labour markets.
Paradoxically,  it may  well  be that where  labour  markets  are most  competitive,  intervention  is most  justified,
sinmce  the in  e  provision  of transferable  skills  is likely  to flourish  only  if labour  mobility  is restricted
On  the whole,  the  arguments  point  to the use  of the  carrot  rather  than resort  to the stick. Certainly
there is a presumption that interventions  justified by equity  or other social  concerns, and perhaps also those
juied  lby  externaLities,  should be financed from public resources.  In the cae  of market failure, if there
is a common thread to the analys,  it is that where an individual  who has rcived  transferable skils leaves
32h  training  firn, it is he who  benefits  at she epense of the training  firm. The rcuting  firm  precipitates
the loss  to the training  firm,  and so incurs  its odium,  but it has to pay  th  market  wage  and so doest  in
fact make  a windfall  gain.  For this reason  there is a prmption  tat  the apprpate  inteenton  should
be the  establishment  of institutional  constraints  on the mobilit of the  for  example,  by  allowing
firms to bond trainees  Where this is not feadble, there may be a cs  for proiding grants to training firms.
Fmaly,  it should  be observed  that  government  iniativa  to pmote  training  ar  frequently  launched
without  reference  to any of the arguments  summarized  in the previou sons.  In some cases,  no doubt,
the initiative  has been preceded  by an unpublished  technical  which  invisibly  underpins  the policy
documents, but in others there must be grounds for suspeng  that the jusiflaion,  such as it is, is expected
to be taken at face value.  Often, it would appear, the justification is simply an opinion that 'not enough
training  is provided  by the private  sector and that more would  be desirable.  The perception  may be
expressed  in absolute terms, for example when it is based  on finding that  relatively few firms provide
structured  training,  or in relative  terms  (in  comparisons  with  the level  of tining  activity  in similar  countries,
or in intersectoral  comparisons,  or in comparsns of training  activity  in lrge and small  firms).  The  truth
of the assertion  that the level  of training  is too low  is frequently  taken  to be self-evident  rather  than  justified
by reference  to objective  criteria.
The looseness,  or indeed  absence,  of supporting  arguments  is paralleled  in other critiques  of private
sector performance:  the failure of the prvate sector to devote adequate  attention to research and
development,  or to make  satisfactory  use of eisting technolofr, its failure  to devote  adequate  attention  to
sourcing,  quality  control  and marketing; and perhaps  also,  its failure  to invest  in physical  capital. As such,
the complaint  about  traiing may  be regarded  as part of a wider  conflict  over  the allocation  of resources  to
consumption  and investment: policymakers  often  seem  implicitly  to be taking  the view  that market forces
result  in an inadequate  commitment  to investment  (whether  human,  intellectual,  organizational  or physical)
and to economic  growth.  Moreover, they appear to be doing so without eplaing  why their view of the
optimal  point  on the trade-off  between  consumption  now  and consumption  in the future  should  prevail  over
the collective  view  of private  decsion-makers  as reflected  in the market.
Of course  it may  well  be the case  that the perception  that the level  of training  activity  is inadequate
could  be justified  on technical  grounds. But even  then it is important  that the technical  case  be put, since
the efficacy  of the intervention  and the equity of resourcing  decisions  may depend upon an accurate
diagosis.
333  $u$sdies and Other  fimancini Incenth  ve
Arguments  in favour  of the public  subsidization  of training  do not automatically  suppor the public
provision  of traiing.  Indeed  many  training  interventions  have  taken  the  form  of incentive  schemes  designed
to expand  the  scale  and  improve  the  quality  of  enterprise-based  training.  However  in many  countries  traning
intevaetions  have  also taken  the form  of subsidized  public  provision  of training.  This section  dicume each
type of intervention  in turn.
3.1  IntrductIon
'Me  otin  7of  souces  and uss  of finnee
Any  government  intervention  which  involves  the subsidization  of training  inevitably  also  involves  the
mobilization  of the necessary  resources  to fund  it.  Often the funding  and spending  are bound together  in
the same  intervention,  as in levy/grant  schemes  and tax  deduction  schemes. While  such  bundling  may  have
administrative  or political  advantages,  there is no connection  in principle  from an analytical  point  of view.
Grants  from  general  public  revenue  should  be expeced  to have  much  the same  effect  on promoting  train
as grants  fnanced by pay-roil  taxes  or implicit  grants  financed  by tax deductions; variations  in the overall
impact  of such  initiatives  should  be attrbutable solely  to the method  of financing.
'To  the extent  that this is the case,  it is appropriate  to consider  sources  and uses  separately. For
example,  in the case  of levy/grant  schemes,  it is appropriate  in principle  to consider  the effects  of the levy
as part of a general  analysis  of the effects  of levies,  and the effects  of the grant arrangements  as part of a
general analysis  of grant schemes,  and hence  evaluate  the overall  impact  of the intervention  by combining
the two subanalyses. In practice,  however,  it is harder  to separate  the effects  of the sources  and uses of
funds,  since  they  tend  to affect  each other  interactively  as policy-making  evolves. The  classic  example  is the
emascion  of levy/grant  schemes  as levy-exemption  takes hold.  For this reason this section,  while
primarily  directed  towards  sources  of funds,  does include  some discussion  of the repercussions  of grants
made with  them. Section  4 looks  in more  detail  at experience  with  different  types of grant scheme.
The inglbllty and Incidence  of subsidies
The net cost of training  to an employer  is the cost of employing  the trainee  and the direct  cost of
training  him,  less the value  of his output. Since  the net cost is the only economic  variable  relevant  to a
training  decision,  an intervention  which  subsidizes  trainee  wages  should  have  exactly  the same  impact  as an
interVention  which  subsidizes  direct  traning costs,  if their impact  on net cosa is equivalent.
For the same reason,  in the case of the subsidization  of trainee  wages,  it makus  no difference  in
substance  whether  the payment  is nominally  received  by the trainee  or by the employer. This is illustrated
by Fiues  3.1a and 3.1b,  where  the solid  lines  represent  the demand  curve  for trainees  by employers  and
the supply  curve  for trainees  as a function  of their  wage. In the absence  of any  subsidy,  market  equilibrium
is represented  by the point  A, the intersection  of the curves,  with  employment  e%  and market-dearing  wage
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f a sudy S  per trainee  is given  to the employer,  the demand  cue  will  shift upwards  by this
amount,  as in Fguw 3.1a. Different  aspects  of the new  equilibrium  are represented  by the points  B and C.
B represents  the outcome  from the point of view  of the trainees: the market  dearing wage  has increased
to w, with the consequence  that the supply  has increased  to el. C represents  the outcome  from  the point
of view  of the employers.  They  are willing  to expand  employment  to e, because  the net cost to them of a
trainee  has fallen  to w,6,  which  is equal  to (w,  a S).
IC,  instead,  a wage-supplement  S is paid  directly  to the  trainee,  the supply  curve  will  shift  downwards
by that amount,  as in Figure  3.1b. Different  aspects  of the new equilibrium  are represented  by the points
G and H. H represents  the outcome  from the point  of view  of the employers Because  trainees  kniow  that
they will receive a wage supplement, they are wiig  to accept a lower market wage from the employer, and
in turn the employer  is willing  to take on more trainees.  The new market wage is ws and the new
employment  level is e2. G represents  the outcome  ffom the point of view  of the trainees. They have
accepted  a lower  wage  from  the employer,  but their  total pay,  taking  account  of the  wage  supplement  is w14,
which  is equal to (ws  + S).  Because  their total pay has improved,  their supply  has increasd
35The crucial  fact to notice  in this analysis  is that the vertical  d  BC and GH are both equal
to S, the subsidy.  Since  there  can be only  one poinli  wWich  the vetical d  i  between  the line  is equal
to a gien  araount,  it foow  at the pos  B and  G a  tical,  te  points  C and  H are identical
that ¢, and  e  are the  same,  that  ws  uis  equal  to a,  and  tat  we  is  equal to  w.  Hence  in either case  the net
cost of a trainee  to the employer  is w°' and the total income  of the  trainee  is w,. The only  difference  is that
the nominal  wage  is higher  in the first cas  than th  second.
In the rst cas, the employer  has to share  par of the subsidy  wit  the trainees,  raising  the nomina
wage  to induce  the increase  in supply. In the second  case,  the traines have  to share part of the subsidy
with  the employer,  accepting  a lower  nominal  wae  to induce  him  to inrease recruitment. In substance
the outcome  is the same.  The total income  of each train  rises  by an amount  (w,  - w.) as a consequence
of the introduction  of the subsidy,  and the  net cost  of a trainee  to the employer  fals by  an amount  (w 0 -w,).
The actual  incidence  of the subsidy  is not determined  by  who  nomialy reeives it, but by the elascities of
the demand  and supply  curves. For example,  if the supply  curve  is relatively  elastic  (relatively  flat),
(w,  - w%)  will  be small  and the subsidy  will  mostly  be appropriated  by the employers,  regardless  of whether
it is formally  paid  to them or to their trainees.
3.2  p  of Taining  Subsidy
Subsidldalon  of  ang  exn e
Schemes  which  provide  firms  with  gpts  for  ining  expeses incurred  by them are now  common
in both developing  and industrialized  countries. The criteria  for compuing  the size  of the grant,  and the
method  of payment,  vary  widely.
Tax dedcbilty  of b8hinBg  eeditw:  Simple tax deducbibility  of training  expenditure  is so much taken
for ganted that it is seldom  the subject  of public  comment,  despite  being  in terms  of resources  the most
important  concession  made  to firms  in many  countries. In the United  States,  for example,  Wagner  (1983)
estimates  that the U.S. Treasury  contnbuted  $2.7  billion  in 1980  to organized  off-the-job  training  provided
by  industry,  twice  as much  as was  spent  on public  manpower  progammes  in that year. This  figure  excludes
the cost of employees'  wages  during  training,  likewise  a tax-deductible  cost, and worth  perhaps  as much
agin.  Almost  certainly  the Treasury's  contribution  to the cost  of  unstrucured  on-the-job  traiing was  much
higher  still  (estimaates  of the total cost for 1980  range  from $2  billion  to $100  billion  (Smith,  1983),  and the
tax contribution  would  again  be about  one third).
The  fact  that training  expenditure  is regarded  as part  of the ordinary  operating  expenditure  of a firm
of course  accounts  for its deductability  being  taken  for granted,  in the same  way  as expenditure  on physical
assets is deductible,  by instalments  througb  depreciation  allowances. Nevertheless,  investment  in human
capital  is typically  treated  more  favourably  than investment  in physical  capital. In the first  place,  the entire
investmen is deductible  immediately,  whereas  that in physical  capital is spread over a period  of years
Second,  transferable  training  in general skills,  the value of which  is (as a first approximation,  at least)
appropriated  by the trainee,  is rarely  subject  to personal  taxation. This gives  firms  and their employers  an
incentive  to tranmute par  of employee  compensation  from cash to trainiW benefits.  Of course the
employes  perception of the value of the training may differ from its cost, but in principle the deviation
36could  be postive as wel as negative: firms  may  be able to provide  valued  traning less  expensively  than
aeteral sources; indeed,  extemal  sources  might  not eist at aLl
Ehanced  eim  schdmes:  In some countries  the grant may be received  in the form of a partial
exemption  from profits  tax,  over and above  the usual  deduction  of such  expenditure  in the computation  of
taxable profits.  In Brazil, for example,  double the epnditure  on approved training  programmes may be
deducted,  with  a maximum  remission  of 10%o  of the liability  to profits  tax. In Chile,  expenditure  on training
may  be deducted  from  the profits  tax  liability  up to a maximum  limit  of 1% of the payroll  (Martinez,  1984).
In the Philippines,  firms may deduct 150%  of the cost of training  in the computation  of taxable  profits,
provided  that the extra 50o does not exceed  one tenth of the wage-bill  (de Is Uana, 1982).
As a slgt  variation,  in some  countries  enterprises  may  receive  tax  credits,  equal  to expenditure  on
traini,  which  can be used to discharge  liabilides  for any national  taxes.  In Argentina,  tax credits  equal
to training  expenditure  are issued  up to a maximum  of 0.8%  of the payroll  (Martinez,  1984).
Perhaps  the most common  arrangement  is a special  case  of the latter,  an exemption  equal  to part
of all of training  expenditure  from a pay-roil  levy,  earmarked  for training  purposes  (Fiji,  Ireland,  Taiwan,
UK).
Fnmally,  what  is effectively  an inverse  levy/grant  system  has been  introduced  in South  Korea: firms
in six  industries  above  a minimum  size  are required  by  law  to train a certain  proportion  of their  workers  each
year,  those that do not are fined  an amount  equivalent  to the estimated  cost of the training  that should
have  taken place.  This arrangement  is of course equivalent  to one in which  firms  are fust charged  the
corresponding  levy, and then reimbursed  if they provide  the training,  The only difference  from a
conventional  levy/grant  scheme  in practice  is that the amount  reimbunred  per worker  is the training  cost
norm,  not the actual  cost of training.
In principle,  the  impact  of  the grant  scheme  should  be much  the same,  dollar  for dollar,  irrespective
of the actual  grant  mechanism  and of whether  it is an outright  grant  or an exemption  from a tax that would
otherwise  have  to be paid.
7)es  of imnig  coveid:  In most training  incentive  schemes  it appears  that the regulations  concerning
scheme approval  allow  firms considerable  latitude in determining  the type of training offered.  As a
consequence  it has frequently  been found that professional  and managerial  workers have benefited
disproportionately,  both in terms  of numbers  receiving  training  and the cost  of their  training, To counteract
this tendency  some schemes  have  been desiped to favour  the training  of skilled  and semi-skilled  workers.
In South  Korea,  only  basic  training  programmes  have  been  eligible  for grants. In Chile,  the scheme  has  been
amended  to reduce  (but not eliminate)  the incentives  for higher-level  traning:  firms  must  bear 30%o  of the
cost of training  those who  earn more than 12 times  the minimum  wage; they  must bear 40% of the cost
of overseas  training; and a ceiling  has  been placed  on the allowable  cost  per trainee  per hour (Gili,  1985).
Subsidizton  of trInee  s
TXhe  subsidization  of trainee  wages  is quite common  in developing  countries.  For example,  the
National  Apprenticship Board  in Sri Lanka  assumes  responsibility  for 100%  of apprentice  allowances;  in
India,  the authorities  pay  50c, up to a certain  limit,  of the stipends  of appreutices  in enterprises  employing
fewer  than  500  workers; in Nepal the authorities  pay  40%  to 60%  of apprentice  wages  in the private  sector
and 100o  in the public sector;  in Singapore,  those completing  military  service and undertaking
37apprenticeship  are given  an allowance  which  restores  their  to their previous  level;  in Australia,
Fiji  and New  Zealand  the wages  of apprentices  during  their off-the-job  i  on are wholly  or parly paid
from public  funds  (APSDEP,  1981).
Other flnanca  Incentives
Fmancial  sticks as well as carrots are used to stimulate  train  The classic  enample  is the
imposition  of a US$100  per month  levy  on the pay of evry expa i  e in the Indonesian  lo  ingdustry
(APSDEP,  1981). The proceeds  are used  for training  puwposes  in the lg  indusry  but the  main  purpose
of the levy  is to encourage  the enterprises  affected  to develop  local  e
33  Evaluating the Impact of Training Incentive Schemes
Studies  of grant  schemes  generally  find a handsome  increas in the volume  of training  immediately
after their introduction  and that this new  higher  level  is maintained  in subsequent  years  Howver he
data typically  cover  only  traiing expenditure  approved  for tax  exemption  and it is never  dear how  much  of
the apparent increase  is attributable  to a genuine  increase  in the volume  of training  and how much is
attributable  to a repackaging  effect:  the adaptation  and documentation  of existing  training  provion  to
comply  with eligibility  requirements  for grants.  And even  when there is a genuine  increse in t1raiing
provision,  it is not always  clear whether  it is attnbutable  to the scheme  or whether  it would  have  occurred
anyway.
TIhe  repackagng effect
Even  when a training  scheme  has been implemented,  much,  probably  usually  the greater part, of
enterprise-sponsored  training  remains  outside its ambit.  There are two reasons for this  First, the
administrative  cost of establishing  the eligibility  of training  expenditure  for a grant  may  exceed  the value  of
the grant.  The initial  hurdle  is the investment  in time required  for learning  how  to submit  an application
for a grant. Then  an annual  training  plan  almost  certainly  has to be drawn  up, sometimes  requiring  the firm
to anticipate  training  requirements  long  before  it is in a position  to identify  its real needs  with  any  accuracy,
and involving  it in paperwork  which  otherwise  would  be unnecessary. Then  detailed  accounts  of traing
expenditure  must be kept,  together  with  records  of other activities  needed  to demonstrate  compliance  with
the regulations,  and finally  more paperwork  must be undertaken  to obtain  payment.
Second,  the cost  of adapting  a training  programme  to make  it eligible  for a grant  under  the training
scheme  may  exceed  the benefit  in terms  of the  value  of the grant  and  the net additional  value  of the training.
In Korea,  for example,  training  programmes  had to be of at least  six  months  duration  to qualify  for a grant.
Some  enterprises  with  shorter programmes  promptly  extended  them  to six  months  when  the grt  scheme
was introduced,  but others preferred  to maintain  existing  arrangements  and forgo  eligibiliy.
No study of the impact  of the introduction  of a grant scheme has come anywhere  near to
disciminating  in a convincing  manner  between  its real impact  and improvement  in the documentation,  or
repackag,  of existing  training provision.  The greater the grants made by a scheme,  the geater  in
principle  should  be the net real increase  in trainiW,  but also the greater is the incentive  to make the effort
to secure eligibility  for exAsting  training.  To be convincing,  such a study would  have to document
38comprehensively  and in detai  the tra9iing provided by a sample of firm  before the introduction of the
scheme and afterwards  - in other words, what is needed is an in-depth micro approach, rather than the
agegate  approach  adopted  in the literatue to date.
The colnddence  of Incraed  bd  need  and In  sctive 
The introduction of a traning incentive sheme  is usually  a respon  to a perceived  incrEa  in the
demand  for skilled  labour.  To the extent that the inm  demand  is for enterprise-specific  Skills,  th
enterprises  can be expected  to undertake  the apprpiate  baini  effort  without  the need  for intervntio
Under  such  circumstances  any  additional  traing  provision  stimulated  by  the incntive sheme amounts  only
to a distortion  in the allocation  of resources  (for  example,  away  from  capital  formation)  unwaated  by any
economic  consideration  of externalities. Only  to the exent that the increased  training  provision  takes  the
form of the development  of general  skills  is it both attnbutable  to the incentive  sheme and warranted  in
principle.
Furthermore,  as Lees  and Chiplin  (1970)  point  out, training  incentive  schemes  tend to favour  firms
with  high turnover  because  they  have  a higher  proportion  of new staff.  f the training  is geneal, the sk
embodied  in a worker  who  quits  would  be of use to his or her  new employer. But if the training  is specifie,
the investment  would  be partly  dissipated,  and the  system  would  in effect  be providing  subsidies  to firms  with
poor labour  relations  and high  turnover.
3.4  Intentlona!  Experience  wit halnkg  l[tAves
Latin America
Until relatively  recently finaial  ilncnivs  to encourage enterprise-based  training were uncommon
in Latin  America. As was  noted  in Chapter  4, payrol levies  have  been imposed  in a number  of counbries
since 1942  and are now widespread,  but they have been used to finance insitutionalized training, and not
as part of the stick-and-carrot  arrangement  of a levy/grant  scheme.
Brazl:  The Brazilian  incentive  scheme  mentioned  above,  implemented  in 1976,  was therefore  a major
innovation,  a "clean  departure  from the Latin American  model' (Ducci,  1983).  According  to Marinez
(1984),  it led to an s8o  incease in traning expendi  and a tripling  of manhours  of training  by 1980,  the
last year for which  he provides  data.  Nevertheless  it is by no means  clear that the impact  of the scheme
was  significant  in scale. Although  the apparent  gwh  rate of approved  training  may  be impfessive,  it still
amounted  to less than three hours per worker  per year for the Brazan  labour  force in 1980,  and total
expenditure  on approved  trang  schemes  was  less  than one fiftieth  of national  expenditure  on education.
(According  to Martinez 112  mMion  manhous of trag  were  conducted  by  approved  programmes  in 1980
and expenditure  on them  was  CrS7.4  billion. The Brazilian  labour  force  was  44 million  in 1980  (LO, 1986,
Table  3), and public  expenditue  on education  was  Cr.$432  billion  (UNESCO,  197).)
One possibilit is that the approved  trainn  was disproportionately  channelled  to a minority  of
occupatons  m the modem sector,  in which  case the low  average  figure  would  offer no guidance  to the
duration  of the training  received  by those  wokers who  did benefit. This  possibility  is reinforced  by the fact
that  only  035% of eligible  firms  sexred grants,  partipation being  disproporionately  weighted  towards  lare
firms.
39A less  optimistic  interpretation  would  argue  that the  average  s  mway  actually  e  t  he impact
of the scheme,  in that part of the approved  training  would  have  been undertaken  anyway  and was  simply
repackaged  to attract  a grant. According  to this  view  the low  participation  rate of small  firm would  reflc,
not a lack of traiing  ne  but the fact that such frmsdid  ind it worthwe  to make the effort to
secure  grants for the traning which  they  did undertake.
CUe:  In the cans of the Chilean  scheme,  implemented  at the end of 1976,  data on manhours  of training
before its introduction  appear not to be available,  but the number  of fims paricipating  almost tripled
between  1976  and 1982  and there  was a corresponding  incease in apprved expenditure. However,  as in
Bra2il the scale  of such  training  may  have  been  too smal for it to have  had a sigificant impacL Martinez
(1984)  reports that in 1981  5.7  million  manhours  of training  qualified  for the scheme. However,  since  the
labour  force in 1981  was  33 million  (ILO, 1986),  this implies  an average  of 2 manhours  of training  per
worker per yea.  Simlaly, the 750 million  peso expenditure  under the scheme  in 1982  repored by
Martinez  is insignificant  by comparison  with the 65 billion peso public  expenditure  on public  education
(UNESCO,  1987). Only 1.4% of eligible  firms benefited  from the scheme.  Updated  fgwes for 1983
provided  by Gili  (1985)  reveal  little  change. As in the Brazilian  casm,  more  information  is required  before
the true impact  can be assessed.
Argendna: The training  grant  scheme  in Argentina  had been  implemented  too recently  (1981)  for Martinez
to attempt  an evaluation  of its impact.
East  Asia
South  Koea: In South  Korea  the Basic  Law  for Vocational  Training,  which  was  itroduced in 1976  and has
been amended  three times since,  requires  enterpri  in the minin  oanufacturin,  oscion,  utilities,
transportation,  communications,  and services  sedors, employing  more  than 300  workers  to train a certain
percentage  of their workforce  each year,  the percentage  being  determined  on a yar-to-year basis  according
to a formua intended  to reflect  current  needs.  Fmns not complyig with  the traing  requiremet have  to
pay a levy  for each  individual  not trained  calculated  at three-quarters  of the avwerage  cost  of  a traing  course.
Even  the ostensible  impact  of the scebme  is hard to determine. The number  of officially-trained
persons  had already  sted  to rise from its average  level  of about 13,000  in the early  seventies  under the
influence  of its predecessor: in 1974  there were 13,000  trainees,  in 1975,  43,000,  and in 1976,  the year  the
Basic  Law  was  implemented,  it rose to 97,000; the net year  it dropped  back  to 59,000, it then rose  again
to 91,ooo  in 1980,  and then over the net  four yea  slid back to the 20,000  - 30,000  range  where it has
stabilized. One factor  behind  these  variations  is the adjustment  of the  trining ratio  which  was  not constant
as in most schemes of this nature.  For example, in 1979  6.7% of workers were sUpposed  to be trained
under the Law, since when it has fallen to less than 2%.  in principle the train  ratio is intended to be
based on an objective measue  of traning needs, but in practice it is determined by baping  betWeen
government and employers (Kim, 1986,  pp. 94-95),  and it is an open question as to what extent the training
effort was responding to the Basic Law and to what extent the reverse was the case.
While the Korean  scheme  in principle  provides  the same  incentives  for trining as a conventional
levy  s  acheme,  there is one important  difference  which  appears  to have  undermined  its effect.  In a
comnnional  scheme,  ent  e  may  have  a strong  preference  for  being  exempted  from  both  levy  and grant,
and  if captued  thy may  tiy to exet colcte  pressr  to keep  the levy  as low  as possible. But gven this,
40they have no aversion  to having  the principle  incentive,  the grant,  made as generous  as posible.  In the
reverse levy  case it is in the interest of the enterprises to emasculate  the active ingredient  as well.  in Kora
firns have  bargained  with the government  to keep the nominal  coat  of tra  well  below  the actual  cost,
to minimize  the fine payable for non-ompliance (Kim, p. 95).  Not siurpringly,  the current impact of the
scheme  appears  to be minimal. The 24,000  workers  trained  under t  scheme  in 1985  represented  barely
two  thousandths  of the non-farm  labour  force  (estimated  by Kim,  p. 13,  at 11.1  million  in that year).
In addition to the aggregate  data, Kim provides cas-study material for a small number of
enterprises  in the sectors  covered  by the Basic  Law.  The overall  impression  is that enterpri  complied
with the law when they could do so with minimum inconvenience  or adaptation and otherise  were n
substantially  affected  by it.  Some  firms,  including  the three automobile  producers,  reported  that they  would
have established  their vestibule  facilities  for basic training  even  if the Law had not been encted  The
duration  of training  schemes  seemed  to be largely  unaffecd  by the law.  Some firms, among  them a
shipbuilder  and a heavy  mechanical  firm,  provided  courses  of  greater  duration  than  the minimum  stipulated
by the Law, while  others, particularly  those in the textiles  industry,  continued  to provide  basie  trainin
courses  of shorter duration  and to pay the levy  as wel as the cost of the training  Many  firms  preferred
to pay the levy  rather than adapt its content  to the basic  level  specfied  by the law. Most  firms provided
short  upgrading  training  courses  which  did not qualify  under  the law. Perhaps  exceptional,  but illuminaing
nonetheless, is the case of a company producing  integrated circuits  it paid a levy  of 8 milion won in 194,
rather than  provide  the  basic  training  for 16  workers  prescbed by  the law,  but nevertheless  spent  250  million
won  on higher-level  in-service  traini
Singapore:  In Singapore training grants have been made from the Skills Development Fund since its
establshment  in 1979. Pang  and Salome  (1986)  state  that 75,000  workers  were  trained  with  grants  from  the
fimd  in 1984,  an impressive  figure  bearngin mind  that the total labour  force  in Singapore  is just over a
million,  but the average  duration  of the course  is not reported.
The main  criticisms  of the scheme  are its overfunding,  its current  relatively  slow  rate of  growth,  the
restiction of grants to classroom  training,  and the fact that large  firms  benefit disproportionately.  The
overfunding  problem  has bee discussed  in Section  4 and does not bear on the effectiveness  of the scheme
as an incentive  to training. The relatively  slow  rate of growth  is probably  not a ground  for citism  but for
congratulation,  a 7% training  rate probably  approaching  saturation  unless  very  short training  interventions
are being  counted.  Pang  and Salome  do not discuss  the rationale  or effects  of the classroom  restiction,
but it is possible  that it is intended  to bias the training  aided  by the fund away  from the firm-speific  in-
service  training  which  would  i  any  case  be undertaken  by  the firms  in their own  interest. The statistics  do
confirm  that large  firms  have  benefited  disproportionately.  29%  of workers  in firms  employing  200  or more
have  been trained  with grants,  compared  with 11%  of those in firms  employing  10-199  and only 15% of
those employing  fewer than 10, but the disproportion is much less marked than in such schemes in most
other countries.
Taiwan: The Vocational  Traning Fund  Statute  1972,  which  raised  a 1.5%  payroll  levy  on enterprises  in the
manufactuing,  mining,  construction,  utilities  and transport  and communications  sectors employing  40 or
more workers,  allowed  contnbuting  firms to redlaim  up to 80o of the levy  to meet approved  traiing
expens  Taiwan  is unusual  among  developing  countries  in conducting  a continuous  training suney,
implemented  as part of the monthly  labour  force  survey. Hence,  subject  to the limitation  that a training
coue  is defined  only  as any tye  of vocational  training  undertaken  for at least four conseutive weeks  in
41the preceding  year, one may obtain a picture of changes  in tr"ai  acivity relatively  free firom  ah
documentation  effect.
The impact  of the scheme  at first  sight  was  impresiv:  it was  implemented  in March  1973  and the
number  of trainees  in the sectors  in question  rose from 52,000  in 1972  to 174,Q0I  in 1974,  about  8% of the
corresponding  labour  force. Nevertheless  in 1974,  in the face  of the world-wide  recession,  the scheme  was
rirst suspended  and then  abandoned  altogether. With  demand  for eports threatened,  the  ion  of
costs  was  assigned  a higher  priority  than  the promotion  of training.
Although  the annual  number  of trainees  then fell,  it remained  at a higher  level  than in 1972: in
1975  it was 103,000,  in 1980  102,000,  in 1983  122,000  (data from San and Chen, 1986,  Table 3.1).  San and
Chen suggest  that "perhaps  one of the side-effecs  of the satute was that increasing  numbers of both
employees  and employers  came  to realize  the positive  impact  of vocational  training  on individual  careers  and
enterprises  on the one hand, and on the entire economy  on the other."  However  in considering  this
interpretation,  it must be borne in mind that the gradual shift towards  the use of more sophisticated
technology  must also have  been responsible  for an increased  commitment  to training.  as in Korea.
Since 1974  government  policy has largely  been directed towards increasing  the provision  of
institutional  training,  but this is still  dwarfed  by enterprise-based  traing,  at least in terms of numbers  of
trainees. In principle  a modified  levy/grant  system  has  been re-established  by the Vocational  Training  Act
of 1983,  with  the rate of contnbution  of each  enterprise  being  determined  by the industry  it belonged  to and
by its size,  but the enforcement  rules have  yet to be determined  and the Act remains  inoperative.
Oter counis  h  the  r8ion: The tax incentive  scheme  in the Philippines  appsr  to have  had a neglible
impact,  only  91 firms taking  advantage  of it in the frst three years,  1977-1980.  This was,  howeveir,  a pilot
implementation  phase  and its coverage  may  be widened  (de la lJana, 1982). The Fiji  tax-deduction  scheme
is intended to promote traiing  in firms large enough to mount approved  training progammes with
registered  training  officers  (smaller  firms may take advantage  of a wage-subsidization  scheme  describd
below). In neither country  does  any evaluation  of the scheme  appear  to have  been  underaken.
Industrlized  countries
While  formal  statistical  analysis  of the impact  of training  incentive  schemes  remains  uncommon,
some  recent  welS-documented  interventions  in Australia  Canada  and the United  Kingdom  have  provided  the
basis  for econometric  studies.
Amstal:  Richardson  (1982)  and Merrilees  (1984)  have investiated the impact  of three schemes  for
subsidizing  apprentice  training.  the National  Apprentice  Assistance  Scheme  (1973-77),  the Commonweath
Rebate for Apprentice Full-time Training (1977 onwards),  and the Employer  Cash Rebate Scheme
(1979-81),  Richardson's  study being descriptive  and confined  to  the metal trades, Merrilees' being
econometric  and covering  the metal,  electrical,  printing.  building  and automotive  mechanic  trades.  The
subsidies  provided  by the frst scheme  were both modest  and taxable,  and not surprisingly  no significan
impact  is detected  by either study. The second  scheme  subsidized  the  wages  of the apprentices  duing their
off-the-job  training. The third,  which  was  supplementary  to the second,  was  explitly aimed  at promoting
apprenticeship  at the margin,  providing  an A$1,000  subsidy  per year for each additional  apprentice.
Together,  the second and third schemes  provided  a subsidy  of about  8% of the average  wge cost of an
42At first  sht  the data on apprentice  rerutment seem to indicate  that the second  and third  shemes
had a strong  impact,  the number  of new  indentures  increasing  even  in the yeas 1978-79  when  the demand
for  silled  craftsmen  was  relatively  depressed. But as Richardson  points  out, tis  finding  mus be qualified
in two important  respects.  First, the schemes  did no lead to a new recritent  to the sector,  but to a
substitution  of apprentices  for tradesman's  assiman  Second,  while the subsidies  contributed  to this
substitution,  rather  more  important  was  the gradual  rise in the relative  wages  of tradesman's  assists:  the
ratio of the wages  of a tradesman's asiant  to those of a first-year apprentice rose from 185% in 1972-73
to 213% in 1978-79. The substitution may also have been eoncouraged  by an improvement  in the qualt  of
those taking  up apprentices
Merrilees  also found  the recuitment of apprentices  in the metal  trades  to be sensitive  to the labour
cost,  the estimated  elasticty  being  approximately  unity  and highly  siglificant. But in none of the other four
trades  is the elasticity  significant  at the 5% level,  and in two of them the elasticity  bad the wrong  sign  In
all five  trades  the elasticity  of recruitment  with  respect  to output  is significant,  and in four the elasticity  of
recruitment  with  respect  to unemployment  is significant.
The results  of this study  are therefore  mixe  On the one hand, according  to Merriees it is the
first to ftnd significant  wage elasticities  with Australian  data, and in this respect  provides  support  for the
effectiveness  of wage subsidies.  But this finding  is restricted  to only one of the five  trades, and so the
support  is weak,  to put it mildly. There are probably  two reasons  for this.
First, although  much  trouble appears  to have  been taken to obtain  appropriate  data, aggepane
studies  of this type  are inevitably  blunt  instruments. A progression  from a general  specification  to a more
specific  one by testing  retictions is ruled  out by  the fact  that the  fit is not good  enough  to allowrestictions
to be rejected. This means  that there is no way  of guarding  against  the risk that variables  included  in the
model  are proxying  for those excluded  from it.
Second,  there is the identification  problem  of separating  the supply  and demand functions  for
apprentice  recruitment. While it is reasonable  to suppose  the demand  for apprentices  to be a negative
function  of their wage  cost, it is equally  reasonable  to suppose  that the supply  of would-be  apprentices  is a
positive  function. Hence  there is no obvious  way  of predicting  whether  actual  recruitment,  the result  of the
interaction  of supply  and demand,  is positively  or negatively  correlated  with  the wage,  and a single  equation
method  is in general  inappropriate. This might  by itself  account  for the insiificance  of the estimate  of
the wage  elasticity  for four of the trades.  The problem  is of course exacerbated  if it is hypothesized  that
the  effect of wages on  supply and demand is subject to  a  distrbuted  lag.  Merrilees mentions the
identification  problem  and implies  that he has resolved  it by appropriate  choice  of time periods,  but details
of the selection  process  are not forthcoming  (reference  is made  to a working  paper).
In conclusion,  the studies  provide  some indirect  support  for the effectiveness  of wage  subsidies  by
confirmig. weakly,  the common-sense  notion  that the demand  for apprentices  is inversely  relted  to their
relative  wage.  Richardson's  study,  although  not econometric,  is more compelling  because  it is based  on a
more detailed  examination  of the trade in queston;  indeed,  she  is credited - by Merrilees -as being  the
first to note that the relevant comparison wage is not that of the experienced craftsman, but that of the
tradesman's  assistant,  a much  closer  substitute  for an apprentice.
For completeness's sake, note should be made of Krbavac's  (1984) evaluation of the effect of the
cash rebate scheme,  the third scheme  descibed above.  He notes that many  of the new  apprenticeships
auacting the rebate would have been contracted  even  if the scheme  had not been established  and he
43estimates the net increment  However his caloda  are based on M  i'  economietric  result  and his
anabysis  is therefore  not independent.
The  econometric  studies  thus  generally  sug  that te  wbid  of  trainee  wages  has  less  effect
than might be exped.  However there are two reasons for treatng  ths  cndlusion  with sme  cauto
Vast, it is dear  that modeling the responivenes  of training provsion to subsidies  is not an easy task, and
it is entirely posble  that the lack of positive  finding  may  largelyft  a lack of success in this respect
Second,  the studies  have  focued on the short-term  sponse  to subsidization  schemes, if only  because  the
schemes  themselves  have  generally  been short-lived It is quite plausible  to arge  that te  adjustment  of
employers'  staffing  practices  may  take  many  years,  in which  case  an  ifi  short-tenr  effed would  not
rle  out a signficant lonterm  one.
Brtain:  The impact  of apprentice  wages  and apprentice  wage  subsidies  in Britain  have  been evaluated  by
Atkinson  (1982)  and Merrilees  (1983). Merrilees'  study,  confined  to the engineering  trades,  is devloped
from an earlier  study  by Undley  (1975)  and is similar  in nature  to his  Australian  study. He finds  expected
output  growth  (proided  by  investment)  to be the dominant  variablt,  but the relative  wag cost measured  in
this case  by the ratio of apprentice  wages  to those  of aaftsme, not semi-skilled  workers,  is also significant
with an elasticity  greater than unity. He also finds  that the backlog  of engineering  orders has a negtie
elastict  and argues that this reflects the fact  that when demand  _inreases  k is rational to reassig  craftsmen
from apprentice traiing  to direct production, at leas  in  the short run.  He  also finds that apprentice
recruitment is a positive  function  of the proportion of apprenticeships  subsidized  by trining  grants in years
when these were made available by the Engineering Industry Traing  Board, but there  must be some
suspicion  of at least partial  tautology  in this relationship. The same  technical  reservations  applying  to his
Australian  study  are relevant  here also. Atkinson  (1982)  is a report  on an intersiew  survey  of 58  employers
in the engineering,  consucion  and road transport  sector  underaken after  several  years  of recson  had
had a severe  adverse  effect on apprentice  recruitmenL  The main conclusions  are tat  recruitment  is
senstively  affected  by  the curent and fuite  employment  prospects  of completig apprentices,  with  the cost
of training  being  a secondary  factor,  'operated  prapmacally  to reduce  unacceptable  recritment levels  rathr
than to  assess sematically  the costs and benefits of apprent  ainini  The findings  therefore
corroborate  those of Merrilees,  the two sudies apparently  having  been undertaken  independently.
Canada: A federal training  program  was established  in Canada  in 1967  under the Adult Occpaional
Training  Act.  Some  of the funds  for industrial  tining  waa  partly  used to reimburse  trainees'  wages: 40
percent  for most eligible  workers,  but increasing  to 83  percent  for workers  with  special  needs  (such  as laid-
off  workers  with  difficlties  in  finding  alternatie employment).  Employers  were  not reimbursed  if a trainee
dropped out of training.  The incentive  was therefore to hire and train reasonably  skilled  workers
(Gunderson,  1977). An  evaluation  of industrial  trainig in Ontario  concluded  that 'the program  was  of most
benefit to persons  in least need of t  ...  to compete  in the labor marketw  (Dymond,  1973,  cited in
Gunderson, 1977).
Simpson  (1984) evalua  the impact of goverment subides  for trWaining  under the Canada
Mapwer  Industrial  Training  Programme  with an econometric  analysis  of data fiom a sample  of 600
establishments. Te  programme  reimbursed  employers  for direct trini  cos  as well  as a portion  of
tai'  wapbs  in approved  training  programs. The intention  was  to support  short training  programmes
to eacour  e development of lower-level  skills  Unfortunately Simpson's findins  are invalidated by
simuItase,oug,  equawu  bias which  he notes but does not altempt to correct  he dependent vanable in the
44statistical  analysis  was the duration  of a training  programme,  and the impact  of government  subsidies  wa
modelled  wsing  a simple  zero-one  dummy  variable  indicating  the  presence  or absence  of government  training
aance  in each  firm  for  each occupation.  As Simpson  points  out, the dummy  variable  could  bi non-zero
only  if train  were  being  undertaken. Although  this matter  is not disa  in the paper,  it is reasonable
to suspet  that the simultaneity was reinforced by the conditions undeir which training was eligble for
support,  for example,  by the use of formal  methods  and minimum  course  lengts
35  The SIde-Effects of Incentive Shemes
The main side-effects  of incentive  schemes  are their tendency  to result  in arbitrary  windfalls  for
some  enterprises  and trainees,  their  tendency  to reduce  the cost-effectiveness  of training,  and  their  imposition
of non-negigible  administrative  overheads.
Windfalls
The theory  outlined  in Chapter  1 indicates  that, in the absene of externalities  or market  failure,
enterprises  can be expected  to provide  training  on an appropriate  scale and to share its cost with their
trainees.  It follows  that financial  training  incentives  may  result  in windfall  payments  to those fortunate  to
qualify  for them, the ultimate  division  of the spoils  between  the firms and their trainees  depending  not so
much  on the formal  desigation of the beneficary  as on the elasticities  of supply  and demand  for trainees.
Where  the scheme  is funded  from  an industry-specific  levy,  salt  is rubbed  into  the wound,  for then  the non-
beneficiaries  may  find themselves  involuntarily  subsidizing  their competitors.
Distortions In tribning provision
Bias  toward  snwased  training:  The impact  of grant  schemes  on the quality  of training  is more  difficult  to
evaluate. The summary  of international  experience  shows  that they  tend  to bias training  provision  towards
unnecessarily  structured  arrangements  and that they penalize  firms which  resist this pressure.  In most
schemes, a firm's eligibility  for grants and levy exemptions  depends on meeting certain training standards,
defined  usually  by  such  input  measures  as type  and length  of courwse,  the number  of trainers  and perhaps  the
possession of certain types of training equipment.  As Grabe (1981) observes in the context of levy/grant
schemes,  they  'tend to emphasize  accountable  costs  and draw  attention  away  from  the less  formal  methods
of traing  thus, for instance, from training given in the work situation.  In other words, they reinforce
the trend towards  fwuther  institutionaisation  of training  and  tend to counteract  efforts  to restore  training  on
the job.'
Bias  towards  high  unit  costs: The fact  that training  grants  are usually  related  to training  expenditure  rather
than any measure of the effectiveness  of the training  means that almost inevitably  incentive  schemes
encourage  unnecessarily  high  unit  costs  (Oatey,  1970). In this respect,  the extension  of levy/grant  schemes
to small  firms  may  be doubly  unfortunate. As has  been seen,  their response  rate tends  to be very  low,  and
hence the levy  amounts  to just another tax.  But when  they  do participate,  they  are much  less likely  than
large  firms  to secure  economies  of scale,  and hence  their  training  programmes  are correspondingly  less  likely
to be cost-effective.
45Administrative  cost tend to be sipifican in schmes aimed  at  dizing  direct  cost
Firms  hava  to prepare  domentation  to support  applcations  for gan  or, equivalently,  levy-m  ption.
The eoomies  of scale  in both acquiig  the neesssa  bweaucratic  ex  and in preprn  applicatio
is no doubt responsible  for the low participation  of smaller  firms in sra  shemes.  In Singapore  this
problem  has  been  addressed  by  set  up a system  of  Approved-in-Principle  courses  to minimize  paperwork,
but nevertheless  only  2% of ert,,rises  employing  fewr than 10 wokrs  had made  successful  application
for grants by March 1985,  as opposed  to 23% of those employing  10 to 50 workers  and 80% of those
employing  more  than 50 (Sinppore Skdlls  Development  Fund, 1985).
Further administr  costs are incurred by the training a  utii  in appraising  applications. The
Irish  Industrial  Training  Authority,  for  example,  retains  about  10  percent  (1.9  million  pounds  in 1982)  of leW
proceeds to cover its operational costs (AnCO, 1983).  It reports difficulties  in determining training costs
because of  differences in accounting procedures across firms.  Difficulties are  also encountered in
apportioning costs among employers with wide-  training needs.
3.6  Subsidied  Instiutonal  Ting
In most countries, even those with apparently-successfu incentive schemes for enterprise-based
training,  the most important  govemnment  intervention  remains  the subsidization  of insdtutional  traininS
Typically  the institution  is publicly-owned,  belongig either to the formal educational  system (formal
training"),  to a national  training  authority,  or to line  ministries  or specialized  agencies  (rnonformal  trainin").
One can find examples  of the public  subsidization  of institutions  owned  by non-government  organizations
or even  the private  sector,  but they  tend  to be unimportant,  especially  in developing  countries.  It is not the
intention  here  to attempt  an general  evaluation  of the success  of interventions  of this  type - a recent  survey
wi  be found  in Dougherty  (1989) - but to focus  on the fmnancing  aspects
The main  difference  between  the  public  and private  provision  of training  is the  weaker  accountability
of both administrators  and trainees in the formaer. In well-funded  systems  (typically  those financed  by
payroll  levies),  resources  may  be dissipated  in ineffective  programmes  with  high  unit  costs  caused  by a failure
to realze economies  of scale;  excessive  administrative  overheads  may  be tolerated,  and funds  may  be
wasted  on ill-advisd research projects or unproductive  conferences  Whereas  levies  for grant schemes often
remain  largely  undisbursed,  the proceeds  of levies  for public  training  systems  are usually  disposed  of with
litle difficalty. In poorly-funded  systems  (those  dependent  on grants from  central  government,  espedawly
at a time of recession),  the difficulty  or impossibility  of scaling  back  the payroD  in line  with  other  expenditure
often results in wholly  inadequate  budgets for training materials  and maintenance,  undermiing the
effectiveness  of the training  and shortening  the life of the facilities.
But far worSe  than the misallocation  of resources  is the failure  of many  public  training  systems  to
deted and respond  to the need  for change. The  weaker  is the financial  control,  the  greater is the likelihood
that traing  policy,  while  paying  lip-service  to the labour  market,  wil in practice  be determined  by other
social  or bureaucratic  objectives.  These  often  fail  to provide  incentives  for  training  establishments  to adapt
dteir programmes  to the evolution  of the labour  force.  Indeed,  the incentives  for management  may  lie in
esaacly  the opposite  direction,  maintenance  of the status  quo being  irreproachable  and there being much
46potential  dane,  with no reward,  in attempfing iovatlo  Hence t is common  to find that tr
establishents  have  ttl  id  of the d  on of past  and lAc th  linm with employm na
to aip  e  hdemand  ffture  owDs,  scoure  thi  havdog  o6tlaswed  their uws  ne  and
filing  to i  nw  ones to mee  emerging  i  llrequiments,  Sd  ed  training porammes  are
ntnously  soe  to inetia of this tw.
'hese emarks hould be qualifed in three ways. Fr  thyw  dsib  general  tendencies. It is
possle  to  cite examples of  public  Wi  establishments  with  plaq  ct-effe  and
_mponawmm  to the local labour  marke  Second,  convrsely,  wtrang  is by no means
immune from the deficienciesd  d abov.  And td,  the fad  that Isitutional  training is under les
pressre tan  etrprise-based  taiing  to met  immediate  sill  equirements  allows  it to be more broadly
based and to include  a stonger theetical  component. For this reason, eme in those countries  with a
srong tradition of eterprise-based training.  much initial trainig  is provided  by full-time  institutional
progmmmes. Common  examples  are the first,  basic,  year  of apprenticeip  triing  and the first year or
two of tehnician  raining.
474  Sourceso  FinanEIce
Chapter  2 examined  the arguments  for government  intervention  intended  to promote  traini  but
it did  not disa  i  any detailthe sources of any  fring  that  ight  be fequired  This chapter  considers
the cas  for relying on the mora orthodox alternatives  general public rvenues,  levies and trainee loans
The  Appendix  to this report reviews  the eVesrience  of the UJ  ley/grant system.
4.1  Enhancing the Private Contribution  toTmng  Fio
Since the competition  for public  resources is intense in most countries, the scope for enhancing the
private  contnbution  to training  finance  should  not be neglected.
Fees  and fa4ning  loans:  In many  countries,  public  training  programmes  ae  traditionally  free or heavily
subsidized  out of public  revenue,  simply  because  the institutes  are publicly  owned. As has been noted  in
Chapter  2, there may  in fact  be good  reasons  for such  subsidies,  but in default  of such  grounds  cost-recovery
via  the charging  of fees should  be the norm. Where  a lack  of coDateral  prevents  individuals  from  obtaining
loans to finance  profitable  investments  in human capital the obvious  remedy  is to provide  financing  via
trainee loans analogous to those available  for financing  higher education in some countries.  This appears
at present  to be unexplored  territory,  but the fact  that many  education  loan  programmes  have  been  successful
(Woodhalt  1983),  and that many  of the loans  taken  out under  such  schemes  are in fact used  for (university-
based) professional  training,  suggests  that training  loan schemes  may be feasible.  That individuals  are
prepared  to view  self-invesment  as a commercial  proposition,  as  evidenced  by  flourishing  proprietary  training
institutes,  is also a favourable  factor.
Pay socnftce:  Chapter 2 noted several instances  where market failure may make it impossible  for firms to
shift the cost of general  training  to trainees  through  reduced  wages. In some of these instances  recourse
to public  financing  may  be avoided  if the cause  of the market  failure  is remedied. Apprentice  traiing is
a case  in point. If apprentices  are treated  as part of the regular  labour  force,  there is a risk  that their wages
may  setde at a level  which  does  not take into account  the cost and value  of the training  being  received  by
them.  In an extreme  case,  where they  benefit from minimum  wage  legislation,  it may  be impossible  to
transfer  any significant  portion  of the cost of training  to them.  Unless  there are over-riding  political  or
social  constraints,  one solution  might  be to assign  apprentices  a separate legal status, as is the case in
Germany,  so that they  are exempt  from minimum  wage  legislation,  and possibly  also from social  security
payments.  The separate  status  may  also  have  the effect  of lowering  immediate  wage  expectations,  especialy
if the eligibility  of the trainee for unemployment  benefit,  where this is available,  is thereby  removed  or
reduced.  For example,  the willingess  of young  people  to take up places  on the low-paid  Youth  Traiing
Scheme  in the U.K has  been  said  to have  been  much  enhanced  by  making  them  ineligible  for unemployment
benefit
It was  noted  in Chapter  1 that some forms  of initial  training  are so expensive  that it is not feasible
to shift  thee  cost to the trainees  via  pay sacrifice  during  the training  period. In such  cases  the cost  could  still
be borne by the trainees  if they  were able to enter into  a contract  with the training  firm  to work  for it at a
beow-market  wage for a number  of years  after completing  the training. The government  may  be able  to
48play a catalytical  role by endosing such a  ments in policy  atements,  thereby giving  them social
legitimacy,  and by enacting  legislation  which  woud provide  a framework  fr  such cotracts  and their
enforeenete
42  Geneaf  PubIll  Revenue
In view of the discussion  in Chapter 2, it can be concluded  that there is a prima facie cs  for using
general  public  revenue  to finance  interventions  motivated  by  equity  or aethe  considerations,  the equity
argument  hain  particular  force in the case of pre-employment  training.  In many  countries  there is a
tendency  for higher  ability  students  to remain  in school  after completing  basic  education  and for those of
lower ability to proceed to some form of initial traini9  If the education of those remaining in school is
subsidized,  it is diminatory  to give  less favowable  treatment  to what is in any case the less prileged
track.  There are of course  limits  to the justifiable  scale  of the subsidy  per individuat  since  the benefits  of
the traning are not equally distrbuted.  Subsidization  of the off-the-job  day-release  instruction  of
apprentices  is one thing  subsidizafion  of expensive  full-time  institutional  training,  especially  of the more
costly  types,  is another. At some  point  it is desirable  to draw  a line  beyond  which  other forms  of financing
should  prevail  The question  of whether  subsidies  should  be channeled to training  institutions  or to
individuals  by way of entidements is complex  For a review  of the isus  and a series of proposals, se
several  of the contributions to Levin  and Schfitze  (1983).
Besides  the theoretical  arguments  for using  general  revenues,  there are practical  considerations.
The most important  one favouring  the use of general  revenue  is that it does not require  the establishment
of additional  tax-cllecting  machinery. On the negative  side, in some countries,  particularly  the poorer
developing  nations, public revenue is so vulnerable in times of recession that it is not a reliable  source of
funding,
43  PaySn  Taxes
The most common type of sector-specific  tax is a payroll tax levied on all establishments  exceding
a certain  size. It is particularly  widespread  in Latin  America  as a result  of the dissemination  of the SENAI
model  of public  training  provision,  of which  it is a notable,  but not essential,  feature: in addition  to Brazi,
it is found in Argentina,  Colombia,  Ecuador, Guatemala,  Honduras,  Paraguay,  Peru and Venezuela
(Cwvalan,  1977;  Castro, 1979).  In most countries  the levy  is restricted  to the industrial  sector  of the
economy,  variously  defined,  reflecting  the limitations  of the scope  of the programmes  offered  by the public
training  establishments,  but in some  it also covers  commerce  and in a few  it is all-embracing  (for example,
Honduras). Small  firms  are normally  exempt,  the threshold  for inclusion  usually  being  defined  in terms  of
the number of workers aad ranging  from 5 workers in Guatemala, Hondurs  and Venezuela to 15 in Peru
The tax  is often set at 1% of payroll,  but sometimes  the rate is higher,  as in the case  of the Cote
d'Ivoire and Peru with 1.5%, Colombia  with 2% and Venezuela  with 2.5% (induding  the employee's
contibution).  In some countries,  particularly  those where responsibility  for administering  a training
promoion scheme  has been devolved  to industry  representatives,  the rate of the levy  may vary among
49diffeent industris, or be levied  in some  but  not  in othes (as in NwZealand, where  it is in force  only  in
dth clothn  tetiles and engineering  industres [APSDEP,  19811,  and in the U.KX  [Appendix)).
Despite the popularity  of levies,  the case for using them to fince  training is seldom made
convincingly.  Indeed,  as a first approximation,  there would  appear  to be no case  at alL If firms  fail  to shift
the cost of transferable  training  to a trainee,  it is the trainee  who  benefits not the firm  who  recruits  him.
So why  should  the recruiting  firm  be expected  to pay a levy?
Perhaps  the bes argument  in favour  of the payroll  levy  is that of Whalley  and Ziderman  (99).
They  begin by pointing  out that the fact that the firm nominally  has to pay a lwy does not mean that in
rnity  the tax  comes from its profits: the finn may  be able to shift all or part of the incidence  of he tax
to the purchasers of its products, via price increases, or to its workers, via lower wages.  The literatue  on
the incidence of payroll taxes, which is complex and largely confined to developed countries, suggests that
in fact  the tax  is shifted  to the workers  Whalley  and Ziderman  argue  that this may  be eMecd  to be the
case in developing  countries  as well.  Hence  according  to them a payroll  tax  used to finane training  may
be regarded  as a reverse  social  insurance  scheme,  in which  the benefits  are received  on entering  the labour
force,  in the form of tranimg, and the contnbutions  are made  afterwards  for the rest of the working  life.
An attractive  feature  of the levy  from  the equity  view-point,  according  to this analysis,  is that those  workers
who receive  most training and consequently  earn the highest  incomes,  will  later be making  the greatest
contributions.
The force  of the argument  depends  however  on the extent  to which  workers  bearing  the cost  of the
levy  do in fact receive  train  benefits. in practice  it is unlikely  that as many  as 15%  of subprofessionals
receive  the kind of pre-employment  traiing that is commonly  funded  by such  levies. Structured  in-service
traiing tends  to be more  broadly  distrbuted,  but it tends  to be quantitatively  much  less  important  in terms
of volume  than pre-employment  training  in develoj$ng  countries. Hence  there is a strong  probability  that
a relatively  smal number  of individuals  will  be arbitrarily  subsidized  by the remainder. One way  out of this
problem  is to target  the levy  to particular  occupational  groups,  as is done  in Malawi  (Whalley  and Ziderman,
pp. 19,20). Employers  pay  tax  according  to the number  of skilled  workers  employed  by  them ani the rate
of the tax  varies  among  occupations  and is related  to the cost  of  the trainin  Assuming  that the cost  of the
tax  is shifted  to the workers,  the arrangement  constitutes  a focuwsed  and relatively  equitable  reverse  social
scurity scheme. It may  also  be regarded  as a virtual  trainee  loan  scheme,  with  the government  paying  the
cost  of the  train  and then  recouping  its cost  by  attaching  their  wages. Administratively,  it may  be simpler
to manage  than  an orthodox  loan  scheme,  but it has  the disadvantage  of repayments  being  less  closely  related
to benefits  than in an orthodox  scheme.  In particular,  workers  trained entirely  on-the-job,  normally  the
great majority  in most developing  countries  even  in skilled  occupations,  would  be contributing  as much  as
those who  had in fact  been trained  with public  funds.
PniW  considerations relating to levies
It is of course  possible  that the theoretical  arguments  are in any case  irrelevant  and that practical
cosiderations account  for the popularity  of the levy. The tax  provides  a sheltered  source  of resources  in
times  of recession  and it may  constitute  a means  of mobilizing  financial  resources  otherwise  inaccessble  to
the public  sector. A selective  payroll  tax  may  also  be used  as an instrument  for restructuring  the economy.
SDThe  payog tax  as e  ee  soume  of resouces: The payroll  tax  dolb  serves  to sheltr resowues
foe tr  ing from  ges  th  economic  environment.  Ther  are  a  three 1n  one may have
on this sON,
First,  no case  has ever  been made  for gn  greater shelter  to public  exenditure on taining han
to, say,  general  education  or health  expenditure,  and it is unusual  for thes  to be funded  by earmarked  tas
in developing  countries.
Second,  a payroll  tax may  constitute  an over-sheltered  sourwe  of revenue: it is often  set at a level
which  generates  more revenue  that the adm  i  can efficently  spend.  The outcome  may be the
encouaement  of a growth  of top-heavy  administrations  and a toleran  of ineffective  training  programmes
with excesively  high unit costs  The operations  of seveal levy-  dLatin American  national  training
authorities  have been criticized  on this score, for example  INTECAP in Guatemala  (Inter-American
Development  Bank,  1983). Of course  in principle  control  medanisms could  be put in place,  but it is not
easy to impose  disdpline  on public  agencies; in some developing  countries  controls  and the auditing  of
internal  and external  efficiency  might  be expected  to be effective,  but in others there is less ground  for
optimism.  Sometimes  the proceeds  of levies  accumulate  unspent  or are diverted  to non-traiing related
objectives.  In Korea,  levies  have  accumulated  in the Vocational  Train  Promotion  Fund,  but only  a small
percentage  of the revenue  has  been  used  to finance  vocational  baning.  Employers  feel  that  the levy  scheme
has  come  to  nothing but  a  new tax burden7 (Kim,  198,  145).  Simlarly,  in Sinpore,  the  Sklls
Development  Fund  had a surplus  of S$432  million  (about  US$200  milion) in 1984  (Pang  and Salome,  1986).
Grants have  been  disbursed  for other purposes  besides  traing  in fact traini  grants accounted  for less
than half the total disbursement  in 1984.
Third,  as in the case  of any  ewmarked  tax,  the  proceeds  of a payroU  tax may  be subject  to diversion.
For example  SENAI  in Brazil  currently  receives  significantly  less  than the amount  collected  in its name.
The payrog ley  and the coiporate tax base:  The payroll tax for training may constitute a means of
mobiizig net additional  resources  for the public  sector  which  would  otherwse be inaccessible. However
this is likely  to be the case  only  if its imposition  for  other  purposes  would  be politically  infeasible  and if there
is no other taxation  of company  income. If the latter  condition  is not satisfied,  it may  in fact  constitute  an
erosion  of the company  sector  tax base.
7he payroU  tar as an  nstunnt  for  restucaWng the labour force:  In Singapore the  payroll tax was
introduced  not just to promote  training  but as part of a more  general effort  to restructure  the economy.
Under the Ski llDevelopment  Ley Act of 1979,  a levy  of 4%,  for the first year  at half  rate, was  imposed  on
the payrol of workers earning SS750  or less per month, the intention being to induce a restructuring of the
economy  in the direction of skill-intensive  and highly-mechanized  activities. The proceeds were intended to
be  used  to upgrade or retrain the affected low-paid  workers.  In practice much of the revenue  has been
unspent, and as a consequence the levy  was reduced to 2% in 1985  and to 1% in 1986.  Furthermore, most
of the training  has been directed  to the more  skiled part of the labour  force,  contrary  to the objective  of
the intervention.
In addition  to not always  having  the advantages  claimed  for them,  payroll  taxes  are responsible  for
potentily seious economic  distorions and undesirable  redistributive  effects. They increase  the cost of
labour  relative  to capital and this may  have  an adverse  effect  on unemployment.  It tends to be regressive
51because  it taxes  labour  g  which  constitute  the bulk of ineme for the  working  poor and the middle
dusm ut  kvw  ooudid  usamedinceme.,  siz  as  ft%dlvi  s rftand  interest~,  the very  sources
of inie  dt&dmagei  the rich  (vIL,  19T7.
4AI  Oter  Sore  d  atee
Althougi the payroll  is the uual object  of a baiNg-relatd  levy,  exports,  impots and sales  have
abo served  as base  Examples  are the 0.03%  lVy on the vau  of e  of the dothing  industry  and the
0.25% lvy  an  the value of constucion  o  worth more thad  W0,000  in Hong Kong, both
establishd to finance  basic  tran  in those  industies (APSDEP,  1981),  and the 02% le  on the value  of
imported  industrial  machinery  in Ecuador  (Castro,  1979).
Most  of the discussion  of payroll  s  also  applies  to these  types  of levy. The main  difference  lies
in their distortionary  effects:  since  they are not directy related to the payrol, they  do not disinate
aist  the utiiation  of labour,  but against  imports,  epo rts, large  08  etc instead.  Smi  they  are
levied  at low  rates the distortionary  impact  is Rely to be smal, but by the same  token  so is the scale  of the
tWaing financed  by them.
52a  ~~~~~~Conclusions
501  Geneml Conclusions
The need  for justil  1ng InterventIon
One conclusion  of this review  of training  finance  is that the cas  for financial  intervention,  and the
analysis  of the incidence  of interventions,  are complex  and that this  compleit  is often  not fuly appr  ed
Indeed  sometimes  national  policymakig  appears  to have  taken  place  in an analytical  vacuum:  the thinln
behind  some  intervention  schemes  seems  to have  amounted  to little  more than an assertio that, Since  the
economy  could benefit from the traiing  of more sffilled  workers,  the goverment or industry  should
intervene  to promote  increased  training  provision. The same  argument  could  of course  be applied  to most
factors of production,  social services  and consumption  goods, and is known  as maximization  without
constraint.
There  are compelling  reasons  for making  the analytical  input  to policymaig more rigorous.  First,
it can reduce the risk of a misallocation  of resources.  This is a particular  hazard  when the interventio
involves  subsidies  which  alter the effective  price of training  services  faced  by either the employer  of the
trainee.  Second,  they  can reduce  the risk of unnecessarily  increaing the burden  on the public  purse: a
rigorous  analysis  of the  need  for an intervention  and of its likely  impact  may  reveal  that  the intervention  may
be justified  on a smaller  scale  than first  envisaged,  or that it may  not be justifiable  at all; alternatively,  the
analysis  may show  that the intervention  is justified,  but that it could  be non-financial  in form.  In some
contexts  non-financial  interventions  may  be more effective,  as well  as more cost-effective. In othrs,  a
miture  of financial  and non-financial  interventions  may  be more effective  than either kind separately.
Examples  of  the  non-financial  interventions  are the exmption  of apprentices  from  minimum  wage  legislation;
campaigns  to  increase the commitment  of firms to  raining, such as the successful  development  of
apprenticeship training, without the provision  of financial  incenive  in Jora  by the Jordanian Vocatial
Training  Corporation; and pump-priming  operatons such  as the provision  of technical  aisan  for the
establishment  of enterprise-based  traning progme  Examples  of mixed  financial  and non-financial
interventions  are provided  by the small-business  assistance  prog mmes that have become inceasi*
common  in developing  countries,  where training  is but one element  of a broader  package.
The Insdiutonal vehcle
A second general point in evaluating  training  interentions is that it is necessa  to attempt  to
distinguish  between  the effectiveness  of the scheme  and the performance  of the institution  implementing  iL
Some  institutions  created  as executing  agencies  have  gone  on to take a leadership  role  in traing  desig, to
introduce  training  standards  and certification,  and to provide  training  advisory  senices to individual  firms
For example,  the U.K. Industrial  Training  Boards  which  survived  the 1982  scutiny  can  ainm  credit  on these
lines  and this is probably  the reason  for their  continued  existence  (see the  Appendix). On the other  hand,
a less proactive institution can add to the dead-weight  of an ir-considered  intervntion.  Not surprisingly,
there seems  to be some  evidence  that the more  mature  the institution,  the more  likely  it is to have  developed
proactive  capability,  but it is not hard to find examples  of passive  stagation.
535.2  ped&concluiosh
7  cWQ fo  0w  buhf  supos
Appm  aeship: Apprenticeship support,  fspe  for the cost of off-the-job traning,  is both the most
readily  justified  financial  traning  inteventio  and one of the cheape  in terms  of  i  overheads.
A case  may  be made on equity  grounds,  one argment  being  that young  people receiving  technical  or
vocational  training  should  be  subsidized  to the same  etent as their p  continuing  with  general  educatio;
on externality  grounds,  if well-tained  wowkes  hve a b  effect  on  th  on-the-job  skill  delopment  of
those working  with  them; on the grounds  of market  failure  (social  or lgl  norm keeping  w  sappre 
above  their  economic  level  and causing  firms  to make  lose  on geal  training imperfec  capital  market
preventing  trainees  from  borrowing  for subsistence); and on the  grounds  that  incentives  may  be needed  to
offset  the effect  of risk-aversion.
In some countries  there may  also be an efficiency  argumet  it is not uncommon  to find  heavily-
subsidized  full-time  public  instional  traing compeing  with  apprentichip tainig  and the instutional
training  may  well  be  significantly  les cost-effecive,  being  more  expensive  and  having  lower  rates  of taiing-
related  job placement  In such  circumsances  inteentions  desiged  to increase  the  proportion  of young
people  takig the  apprenticeship  route,  by  enhanang  its attractveness,  could  lead  to a net  saving  of pubi
resources  as  well  as  to more  effective  skill development
It should however be acknowledged that when the supply of traing  places is relaively  inelastic,  as
it is in many  countries,  app  cip  support  can at best be expected  to be a long-term  measure. In the
short  run the effect  of such  a scheme  may  be overwhelmed  by cyical factos  It should  also  be  reconizcd
that such  a scheme  cannot  be expected  to counteract  the effects  of a long-term  trend. And  this may  be just
as welL  The decline  of the manufcurng  sector  in the UJL may  be aate  to many  factors - an
exchange  rate kept artificly  hgh by placing oil rfevnues  to current  account,  failures of managment,
industrial  research  and development,  etc. - but it has certainly  not been caused  by a shortage  of skilled
labour. Skiled  craftsmen  have  been  just as  vulnerabl  as  unskilled  labour  in  the  dedine, and the reductio
in apprenticeship  training  has served  to miate,  not  aavate,  the problem  of their unemployment.
Insdlunal  p  mpkowe  h  ftanig  Subsidizaio of full-time  insttutional  pre-employment  training  may
be justfied on the same  equity  and exernalit grounds  cited in the cas of apprenticeship. However  two
factors are likely to limi the scale  of justifiable  subsidization. One  is efficiency  there can be no
justification  for traing  workes in exces of likely labour market  absorion.  This remark applies
particularly  in the  context  of secondary  vocational  education,  which  is tpicaBy  more  expensive  than  general
education  and fully  subsidized In some  counties  the official  policy  is that such  training  will  eventually  be
provided  on a large scale, despite the fact that only a small  fraction  of the graduates  are likely  to be
absorbed  in tra inirelated jobs.  The other constraint  on subsidization  is the cost  of cerain  types of
trainig  The equity  argument  cannot  be used  to justify  the subsidization  of expeve  traing  which  leads
to high subsequet earnings.  Here the appropriate  intervention,  if any  should  be needed,  is more  likely  to
be a loans  scheme,  possibly  with some  subsidy  element
In the case of the di4atgeAd,  the arguments  for subsidising  institutional  training may be
reinforced  by  speial equity  considerations  and social  considerations  of the kind  outlined  in Section  2.4.
54The cas  for In-serIe  trinng  support
The limited  ability  of enterpses to recover  the cost of tranferable in-service  train  may  inh
its provision  and hence  constitute  a ground  for training  grants. Regrettably,  however,  whether  pant systems
have  a significant  impact  in practice  is open  to doubt. In-service  training  to be well-established  oniy
in those countries  where  internal  labour  markets  are important  or where  ther  are other  socio-instiutional
restraints  on inter-firm labour mobiity.  Experience  with  intervention providing  grants  to firms for general
trainng expenses  indicates  that the impact  of such  schemes  is often  minimal  in terms  of the average  number
of manhours  of train  per worker  per year.  It is of course  possible  that some have  been successfully
targeted  to key types  of worker  and have  provided  signficant  traning for them,  but there seems to be no
positive  evidence  on this score. Further,  there  must be some  risk that much  of the traing  credited  to such
schemes  would  have  taken place  anyway. There is also evidence  that such  schemes  can cause  undesirable
distortions  in the type  of training  provided,  employers  choosing  inefficient  modes of training  in order to
qualify  for grants  or levy-exemption,  and that they  can be expensive  in terms  of administrative  costs.
Financing training with a levy
The case  for financing  traiin  grants  by means  of a payroll  levy  (or indeed  any other  levy)  has been
examined  in Chapter  4 and found  to be much  more  fragile  than  is commonly  supposed. The usual  rationale
is that non-training  firms  benefit  at the expense  of those  providing  training  when  they  recruit  tained workes
However it is more reasonable to suppose that it is the trainee, not the recuting  firm, that makes the
windfall  gain  at the expense  of the training  firm,  and hence  the  argument  for penalizing  recruiting  firms  loss
its force. The  rationale  due to Whailey  and Ziderman  (1989)  is more  persuasive,  but even  according  to their
analysis  a uniform  levy  of the kind existing  in most countries  is likely  to cause  severe  inequities  among
individuals. To remove  the inequities  it is necessary  to vary  the rate of the tax according  to the type  of
worker  employed,  as is done in Malawi.
The negative  aspects  of levy  schemes  is that they  give  rise to avoidable  administrative  cos  incurred
both by the national  authority  and firms in scope to it, and to a misallocation  of resources  that almost
inevitably  results from the impositon of an earmarked  tax  Furte,  the establishment  of a levy/grant
authority  can have  a sclerotic  effect on training  provision,  reducing  its capacity  to respond  to changes  in
training needs.  As Grabe (1981)  observes,  "an effect  often overlooked  is the bureaucratisation  of the
trainig system  which  has taken place  in most  countries  in which  a levy  system  has been  introduced.  Some
of the national  traning bodies  created  with  its help  have rown  into comprehensive  organisations,  some  of
them with more administrators  than teachers  or instuctors  While training  in the past generally  was
underadministered  and still is in many  countries,  a levy-guarantee  scheme  seems  to invite  moving  to the
opposite  extreme. This bureaucratisation  applies  not only to the central  body  and its regional  wing but
often  also to the indutrial and other undertakings  concerned.- Possibly  one of the stronger  arguments  in
favour  of a levy  is that it may  in certain  countries  offer a means  of broadening  the tax base, but even  this
mus be in doubt if corporate  taxation  has been effectively  established.
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Argably, however,  the most effective  intervention  is an indirect  one.  All the evidence  show that
firms are disproportionately  willing  to invest  in the training  of their more skilled  or educated  workers,
whether  or not the go-crument  provides  training  incentives. One reason  for this may  be thlarge  firms
both tend to employ  a greater proportion  of such  workers  and are more  likely  to mount  systematic  training
programmes. But another,  and probably  much  more  important  reason,  is that the value-added  of trainig
is greater for such  workers. Or, to put it another  way,  that training  and education  are complementary.
The conclusions  of Pang  and Salome  (1986,  p. 121)  concerning  the diversion  of the proceeds  of the
payroU  tax in Singapore  from upgrading  low-skilled  workers  are typical:  tAnalysis  of survey  finding
revealed  that across  the board, unskiled  workers  were  the least  trained,  of all the workers  in the workforce.
Training  was  often  restricted  to on-the-job  trainig or short  in-house  programmes  (as in some  hotels)  which
was really to impart the basic  skills  necessary  for the jobs.  There were hardly  any attempts  made (by
companies)  to upgrade  the skills  of the  unskilled  workers. However,  this  was  not entirely  due to companies'
lack  of interest  in training  the unskilled  workers. More correctly,  it was  due to the lack  of basic  education
among  the unskilled  workers  that makes  it almost  impossible  to send  them on skills  upgradit  coutses.
in other words,  the most effective  financial  intervention  for traiing may  be to upgrade  the basic
skills  of the work  force,  in terms  of literacy,  numeracy,  cogitive abilt,  communication  and interpenal
skills,  etc.  This may take the form of a remedial  programme. For  ammple,  in Singpor  there is the
BEST (Basic Education for Skills Training) progrmme.  Pang and Salome considef that  'the
implementation  of the BEST  programme  by the Government  to help the unskilled  workers  to obain the
basic  literacy  and numeracy  skills,  necesary for further  trainig  was  vital  for their upgrading  But the
are problems  with  remedial  programmes.  Adult  workers,  particularly  older  ones,  tend  to lack  the motivation
to participate,  and participation  is often  made difficult  by disruption  caused  by shiftworking
The alternative,  which  has the additional  merits of cheapness,  high coverage  and equity,  is to
improve  the quality  of basi  education.  From a political  point  of view,  this alternative  may  be unpalatable
because  basic  educaion does  not have  a lobby  and,  unlike  direct  traiing initiatves,  such an intervention  is
almost  invisle.  But it is the standard  against  which  al other initiatives  should  be measured.
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The U.L  Experience  with IHAwy/Gramit
The British  experience  with levy/grant  has probably  received  more attention in the published
literature  than  that of any  other  country  and illustrates  most  of the issues  relating  to such  schemes  described
in Chapter 4.  For this reason a brief review  is offered  in this appendis,  despite  the limitations  on its
relevance  to a less-developed  country  contex.
Prior to the Industrial  Training  Act of 1964  there  was  no legislation  goveing  training  in the U.K
The Statute  of Artificers  of 153 had been repealed  in 1814  (Peny, 1976). The 1964  Act was  predicated
on the assertion  that "a serious  weakness  in our present  arrangements  is that the amount and quality  of
industrial training are left to  the unco-ordinated  decisions  of a  large number of individual  firms
(Government  White  Paper  Indusal  TraMing  Goverment  Poposals,  December  1962,  quoted  by  Woodha,
1974). While  there is general  agreement  that the qualit of training  left mucb  to be desired,  the belief  that
the volume  of training  was  inadequate  was  unfounded. As Merrile  (1983)  points  out, 'during  the 1950-64
period,  the typical  excess  demand  for craftsmen,  that is,  vacancies  minus  unemployment,  was  about 1  or 2%
of the stock of craftsmen. For one or two  years  and in some industries,  the fraction  was  slightly  higher.
The fact  remains  that the quantitative  shortfall  of craftsmen  was  not a soial crisis  and per se did not create
an overwhelming  justification  for the 1964  Act."
Be that as it may, the Act was passed with great expo1ons  concernivg its impac  Its most
important  provision  was the establishment  of sector-specific  Training  Boards  for this purpose  with equal
numbers  of  employer  and  employee  representatives  and  a smaller  number  of educationalids Crucally,  each
Board was  given  the statutory  power  to raise  payrol levies  and make  grts  to the enterprises  deemed  to
be in scope to it.  Within  a few  years of the passage  of the Act an Agricutural  Training  Board and 27
Industrial  Trainig Boards  had been established.
The reign  of the Boards  as supreme  bodies  in the training  field was  brief  In 1974  a national
training  authority,  the Manpower  Services  Commission  (MSC),  was  ceated alongside  them. In 1982  all  but
seven  Boards  were abolished,  one being  merged  with  another  but the rest being  disbanded  entirely. The
levy/grant  system,  which  was  initialy  implemented  with  enthusiam by  the Boards,  was  in retre  even  before
the MSC  was  set up.  A Government  consulative  docment published  in 1972,  7hiningfor  the  Feau (U.K
Department  of Employment,  1972),  went so far as to say  that it needed  "to be phased  out at a reasonably
early  date".  Why  were the policies  which  led  to the 1964  Act altered  so radically  and so quickly?
There are several  partial  explanations.  One is that the decntralized  system  of Industrial  Traiing
Boards  encountered  greater administrative  problems  than had been  anticipated. Another  was  a desire  on
the part of the government  of the day  to move  away  from  a statutory  approach  to a voluntary  one.  But the
most important  reason undoubtedly  was  the fact that the levy/grant  system  was  established  in response  to
an impulse  of the kind descibd  in Section  25, rather than  any well-considered  rationale. The history  of
the I/grant  system  in the U.K in the late 1960s  and early  1I7  is a classic  example  of a society  adopting
a non-analtical  approach  to the recdification  of a misake.  With  the traditional  theory  of apprenticeship
being ignored and the Beckerian  formalization  being developed too late to offer analytical  guidance,  learning
57by experience  has been the only  means  of ameliorating  an unsatisfactowy  situation,  and it has been pa
slow,  imperfect  and incomplete.
Although  the contradictions  in the poaching  illusion  were undetced  by those responsibl for the
1964  Act, they  became obvious  to the Training  Boards and their members  as soon as die time  ame to
implement  a levy/grant  scheme,  and by  1974  Woodhall  (1974)  could  write  that "most  boards  now  accept  that
the view, prevalent in 1964,  that traiing  costs should be redisbuted  in order to prevent 'poadg  of
trained workers by small firms who provide no traing,  is oversimplie
The fist setback to the new order was the widrawal  of the Aal  Training Board from the
levy/grant system in 1969,  barely three years after its establishment,  its resources subsequently  coming firs
from a fund for subsidizing  agriculture  and later from  gneral government renue.  The inequity  of the
system  was evidently  much  clearer  to the farmers  than to the framers  of the Aet  Not only did they  have
to pay a training  levy,  but when their workers  received  the training  it could have  adverse  effects  An
illustrative  example  is that of a farmer  who,  when  taken  to court for refusing  to pay,  said the scheme  was
making  it impossible  for employers  to keep  their  workers  on a realistic  lvel of pay. One of his  workers  was
sent off to a college  course  financed  by the levy. When  he returned  with  various  qualifications  he prompdy
left to become a laboratory technian  where he could earn more money (Perry, 1976).
Most Boards  managed  to retain the levy/grant  power  but found  ways  of mitigating  the arbirary
reallocation  of resources  from non-training  to training  firms. First,  universally  if usually  reluctantly,  small
fims  were given exemption.  A second response was to inroduce  a system of differentiated levies under
which firms were treated differently according to their product mix, their size, or the occupational profile
of their labour force.  These differentiated  systems  were evidently  desied  to bring the levy  for each cla
of firm into line with the  pants  that were likely to be  eamed  - in other words, to neutralize the
redistributive  effect of the levy/grant  system.  A third response  in many  of the Industrial  Boards  was a
movement  towards  levy-exmption. They  became  increasingly  prepared  to refund  a large  proportion  of the
levy  due from a firm if the traning offered  by it met a number  of criteria.  As time went by a growing
proportion  of firms managed  to qualif and the levy  became  mainly  a means  of providing  the resowees  for
the training  advisory  services  provided  by  the Boards  and their administrative  overheads.
Ironically,  the drift towards  levy-exemption  was  taken  by the Secretary  of State for Employment  in
1972  as evidence  that the levy/grant  schemes  had been so successful  in promoting  traiig  that they  had
made themselves  redundant  and that it was  time to do away  with the 0cosly, time-consuming  and iriant
machiner  necessary  for implementing  them (Thhhng  for die Fkauw,  U.K Department  of Employment,
1972).  This view,  which  was contested  by the trades  unions  (U.K Trades Union Congress,  1972)  and,
naturally, the Boards themselves  (for example,  the Engineering  Industrial Training Board.  BACE,  1972,
p. 21), does not appear to have been based on empirical evidence.  Indeed the consultative document
conceded (p. 51) that, with a diminishin  number of young people seeking employment for the first time,
the number of apprentices had actually  fallen since the passage of the Act, from 135,000  in 1965  to 112,000
in 1971.  Accordingly  it must be suspected  that the proposal  to phase  out the levy/grant  schemes  was at
least partly  motivated  by a desire  to subordinate  the  Training  Boards  to the about-to-be-established  nadonal
training  authority  by making  them financially  dependent  on it.
The national  authority, the Manpower Services Commission, was established  in response  to the
perceid  a  bia  ative we8_  of the Boards.  their inabiliq to covr  the whole workforce while
aning  their abity to cater to the  spedalist  neds of particular  induswtries;  their  inability  to facilitae the
58intersectoral  or geogaphical  reallocation  of labou,  the difficulty  in _a  gi  urnig  pr.  f
occupations  common  to more  than one  sector, and their  difficulty  in catering  to the problems  of sma firm
(Thbd,g  for the FeA,  pp. 15, 16).  Until i  ren  demise, it dmw its fiuds  from central gwerest
revenue and the greater part of them were spent on pr-employment  training of youg  people, the Youth
Traiing Service  alone  accounting  for 75%  of the  budget  in 1986/87  (UK  or  Sefvcs  (  o,
19B7).
The Boards  coexised  with  the MSC  for ten  years  unil 1982  when  all but seven  were  abolished  after
an official  review  (U.K Manpower  Services  Commision,  1981). The oidal  reaswn  for the suviv  of these
that remained  was  that they  were deemed  to be of  nral  impoane  for the eonomy and could  not be
replaced  by  voluntary  arrangements. In fact it is probably  more  accurate  to say  that they  owe  tersu  al
to their contnbution  to an improvement  in the quality  of trani  the introduction  of a modular  system  by
the Engineering  Industry  Training  Board, the spread of day-release  which  became  for many boards a
condition  of grant (Woodhall  1974),  and a rapid  incease in the numbers  of instrors  and training  officers
employed  by enterprises. The remaning boards still operate levy/grant  schemes  but the net transfer  of
resources is negligible  by comparison  with that effected  by the MSC.  For enmple, the Eniing
Industrial  Trasiing  Board,  one of the largest,  bad a nominal  income  of £177  million  in 1986/87,  but £150
million  was  rebated to firms in scope  and only  £12 million  was paid in granL  By comparison,  the MSC
spent £891  million  on the Youth  Training  Scheme  in that year.
Curiously, it is an open question as to whether eter  the rse or the fal  of the levy/grat  system
were influenced  sinificantly  by an economic  analsis of the incidence  of tining  costs.  Te  Beckerian
theory was presented in a relatively  informal  and accessib  format by Les  and Chiplin  (1970),  and
developed  formally  by Oatey  (1970). The  conibuon  sparked  futher commentary  in the professional
journals  (Johnson,  1971;  Petman, 1972;  Hughes,  1973; Woodhag,  1974). But there is ltde evidence  that
this Uterature  had any  sustained  impact  on offiWl  thinking,  at leas at the time.  For  example,A  Fnanwwo*
for (he  Future  (U.K Manpower  Services  Commission,  1981)  uncritically  rates  the view  that 'the liability
to pay a statutory  levy  may seem  a useful  way  of enring  that 'poachg  firms  make some contribution
towards the industry's train  costse.
Several studies have examined  the issues from the vwpoint  of the tradito  theory of
apprenticeship,  coming  to the conclusion  that apprentice  wages  were too high for firms to recoup  their
training  costs (Adknson,  1982; Jones and Holienstein,  1963; Prais and Steedman,  1986). Perhaps  these
sudies are having  an impact,  for the traditional  theory  of apprenticeship  has surfaced  in two recent  White
Papers.
ThngforJobs  (UX. Department  of Employment,  1984)  argues  that  trainees  should  reognz  that
their pay should  reflect  the value  of their  tning:  Mat  means  keeping  training  cost dowN  induding  the
acceptance  by traees  of levs  of income  which  refect the value  to them  of the training  gin  ...  Trainees
themselves  need  to accept  that the total  cosa of tining  must  be taken  into  account  in detemining  the  level
of dteir pay or allowances.
In simiar vein,  Ed  and 7hdnbg  for Young  Peopw  (UJK D  rtment  of Education  and
Scice,  195) notes that 'in vtualy  all our competitor  counties young  people  are treated as leaners at
le"ast  unl  the age of 18.  This  is refleced in their status  (instead of a cantrc  of employment  there is often
a  oefd  trainn),  in the nature of their  remuneraton  and in the level  of that remuneration'.
59However,  there appears to have been a relapse,  since  there was no reference  to this source of
finance  in the fecnt  csuati  document  on hd  training  in t  UJ  (U.1K  Manpowr Seniea
Comnmisaion,  I9g7). Perhaps  tis  is a cosequence of the fact  that  iig  has  been  prov  as a mease
for improving  the tranion  from  school  to work,  and m  i  the  poblem of youth  unemployment,  rather
than for developing  occupational  skill  It will  be inte e  o see w  haes  in the  yeas as
the supply  of new entrants  to the labour  force  fblls  ad  youth  unemploymea  ceases  to be a macro-scal
problem.
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